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MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN
CONSUMER CONTRACTS: CONSUMER
PROTECTION AND THE CIRCUMVENTION OF
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
Under traditional consumer law, if a large corporation violates stat-
utory consumer rights or subjects a consumer to an invalid contract
under federal or state law, the consumer has the right to use federal
and state judicial systems to recover damages against the corporation.1
However, under modern consumer law, many consumers are banned
from using the judicial system and forced to submit their claims to
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms because they unknowingly
signed an agreement to arbitrate their disputes outside the judicial
system. 2
Out of court arbitration was initially created so that parties, with
equal bargaining power, could reduce the costs of litigation by agree-
ing to resolve their dispute through the use of a mutually acceptable
arbitrator.3 In some instances, dispute arbitration relieves a burdened
judicial system that would otherwise resolve the dispute in the court-
room. 4 Unfortunately, in other instances, such benefits are not likely
to accrue when powerful parties are able to mislead less powerful op-
ponents into agreeing to arbitrate disputes, thereby waiving the right
to use the judicial system. The less powerful party, consequently, may
turn to the judicial system for relief from the imposed arbitration pro-
1. Consumer access to the judicial system, when a federal statute is violated, is a fundamental
right guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Under the Seventh Amendment, consumers
have the right to bring forth any claim worth twenty dollars or more before a jury for the viola-
tion of a consumer protection statute. See U.S. CONSTr. amend. VII.
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.
Id. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, consumer property is protected from state laws that may
deprive consumers of the property without due process of law. See U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § I
(stating that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .... ").
2. See infra note 7 (defining arbitration).
3. See NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM, CODE OF PROCEDURE, Rules 1-2 (Sept. 1, 1999) (ex-
plaining that the code governs arbitration when parties have entered into an arbitration agree-
ment which refers to the National Arbitration Forum).
4. See infra notes 278-305 and accompanying text.
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cedure and seek to either void the arbitration clause or to appeal from
the arbitration judgment. 5
When a consumer is forced to arbitrate a dispute with a company,
the case often arises out of an adhesion contract 6 that includes a
mandatory arbitration clause. A mandatory arbitration clause is a
contractual clause which stipulates that parties will arbitrate out of
court, any disputes regarding the contract, and waive their rights to
use the judicial system. 7 Consumers are not often given the opportu-
nity to bargain for the admission of an arbitration provision in an ad-
hesion contract offered on a "take it or leave it" basis.8
Arbitration clauses often appear in fine print on the back of an ad-
hesion contract or are later added pursuant to a change-in-terms
clause which allows a company to alter the terms of the original agree-
ment at any time. 9 Arbitration clauses are seldom discussed with con-
sumers, especially in credit card agreements or other transactions that
are conducted through the mail. 10 Arbitration clauses are typically
drafted by sophisticated attorneys, employed by large companies, and
imposed without giving effective notice to consumers entering into the
adhesion contracts. Normally, consumers do not seek legal advice
before entering most adhesion contracts included in credit card agree-
ments, loan or mortgage agreements, auto financing agreements, and
product warranty or liability agreements. In addition, companies
often require consumers to agree to the arbitration clauses in order
for the company to do business with them."
5. See infra notes 313-313 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 335 (describing an adhesion contract as one offered on a "take it or leave it"
basis for which the consumer did not bargain).
7. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 INi). L.J. 425, 425 n.1 (1988)
(stating that "'[a]rbitration' is a process whereby parties voluntarily submit their disputes for
resolution by one or more impartial third persons, instead of by a judicial tribunal provided by
law"). Arbitration is a creature of contract. Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law is
No Excuse: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 49, 55 (1997). Parties con-
tractually agree to arbitrate their disputes privately in a process which is structured according to
the agreement by the parties. Id. at 55-56. See also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514
U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (stating that "[a]rbitration is simply a matter of contract between the par-
ties; it is a way to resolve ... disputes"); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Exalon Industries,
Inc., 138 F.3d 426, 428 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating that national policy favors arbitration, and that
submission of disputes to arbitration depends upon the contract entered into by the parties,
which embodies their private will).
8. See infra notes 335-338.
9. See infra notes 159-159 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 210-227 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 337-338 (explaining that a consumer had no meaningful choice in entering




A typical arbitration clause from an adhesion contract might read as
follows:
IF EITHER YOU OR WE ELECT ARBITRATION, NEITHER
YOU NOR WE SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE
THAT CLAIM IN COURT OR TO HAVE A JURY TRIAL ON
THAT CLAIM. PRE-HEARING DISCOVERY RIGHTS AND
POST-HEARING APPEAL RIGHTS WILL BE LIMITED.
NEITHER YOU NOR WE SHALL BE ENTITLED TO JOIN
OR CONSOLIDATE CLAIMS IN ARBITRATION BY OR
AGAINST OTHER CARDMEMBERS WITH RESPECT TO
OTHER ACCOUNTS, OR ARBITRATE ANY CLAIMS AS A
REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF A CLASS OR IN A
PRIVATE ATFORNEY GENERAL CAPACITY. 12
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)' 3 in
order to encourage the arbitration of private disputes.' 4 The FAA has
been interpreted by the judiciary as requiring the courts to enforce
arbitration clauses when they appear in contracts. 15 While the FAA is
an influential in courts' decisions,' 6 the court will not disregard all
12. DISCOVER PLATINUM, GREENWOOD TRUST COMPANY, Notice of Amendment To Dis-
cover® Platinum Cardmember Agreement (1999) (explaining the new arbitration requirement
included in the changes-in-terms clause credit card agreement that was sent out to Discover
Platinum Card customers in August of 1999).
13. 43 Stat. 883 (1925). In 1947, Congress reenacted and codified the FAA as 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15
(1947). See Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (explaining the
history of the FAA).
14. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1925). Section 4 of the statute states:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate
under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court
which, save for such an agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil
action or in admirality of the subject matter of a suit arising out of controversy between
the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided
for in such agreement .... The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied
that the making of the agreement for arbitration of the failure to comply therewith is
not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitra-
tion in accordance with the terms of the agreement.
19 U.S.C. § 4 (1925).
15. See Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 (1987). See also Alan S.
Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Alternative to Litigation Attracting Consumer Financial Services
Companies, in ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES: SAMPLES, STRATE-
GIES AN1D CASES 4 (1999) (stating that the Supreme Court interpreted the FAA as requiring
"both federal and state courts to enforce valid arbitration agreements by staying lawsuits involv-
ing claims that are subject to an arbitration agreement and/or compelling a party to arbitrate in
accordance with an arbitration agreement").
16. "An arbitration 'provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce . . . [is] valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.'" Stiles v. Home Cable Concepts, Inc., 994 F. Supp.
1410, 1414 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (quoting the FAA at 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1925)). "The Arbitration Act
[FAA], standing alone,... mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims."
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987). A federal policy favor-
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consumer challenges to arbitration clauses.' 7 Large corporations have
successfully used the FAA to stay litigation when consumers unknow-
ingly waived their rights to access the judicial system.18 A stay in liti-
gation often amounts to a stay of the dispute altogether, because
consumers are less willing to arbitrate disputes than have a jury decide
the outcome.' 9 Nonetheless, consumers can still challenge arbitration
clauses by arguing that they violate state contract law, congressional
intent with respect to federal statutory claims, and rights guaranteed
by the United States Constitution. 20
While out of court arbitration may be beneficial for parties with
equal contractual bargaining power, it is inherently unfair in situations
where the parties exhibit a substantial disparity in power. 2' Congress
ing arbitration is established by the FAA, which requires that courts "rigorously enforce agree-
ments to arbitrate." Id. (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
17. See infra note 20 and accompanying text (listing ways for a consumer to challenge an
arbitration clause).
18. See Stiles, 994 F. Supp. at 1410 (holding that an arbitration clause was enforceable even
though the consumer did not know or understand that it was added to the contract because the
consumer assented to the contract as a whole, including an agreement to allowing the company
to change the terms at any time); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-51 (7th Cir.
1997) (holding an arbitration clause, located inside the box of a computer purchased by the
consumer, enforceable even though the consumer could return the computer if he did not to
agree with the terms). See also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding
that consumers are bound by terms inside the box of a product that they purchase as long as they
have the opportunity to read the terms and reject them).
19. For instance, in the health care field "more than two-thirds of the complaints filed against
a health-care provider were dropped when the plaintiffs discovered that their claims were sub-
ject to arbitration and would be determined by arbitrators rather than a jury." BERTHOLD H.
HOENIGER, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION HANDBOOK § 1.04 at 1-7 (1991).
20. The FAA allows states to protect consumers against unfair contracts that include an un-
wanted arbitration provision. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., 513 U.S. at 281. "States may regulate
contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law principles and they may in-
validate an arbitration clause 'upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract."' Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1925)). See also Doctor's Assocs., Inc., 517 U.S. at 687
(stating "generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may
be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening [the FAA]"). The FAA
may be "overridden by a contrary congressional command" if the party opposing arbitration
meets his burden of proof that "Congress did intend to limit or prohibit a waiver of judicial
forum for a particular claim." McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226-27.
21. One advocate of arbitration used an analogy of David and Goliath to describe how an
arbitration clause might affect the disparity in power between two parties as follows: "'Goliaths'
(e.g., banks, insurance companies, and landlords) may fear the emotional biases of juries if they
find themselves in disputes with 'Davids,' (e.g., borrowers, insureds, or tenants). ['Goliaths']
may also see an arbitration clause as a measure of protection against high jury verdicts, including
the possibility of punitive damages." HOENIGER, supra note 19, § 1.04 at 1-6. While the arbitra-
tion advocate believes that arbitration clauses protect Goliath from David, a consumer advocate
used the same analogy to argue that it is David who needs the protection:
Remember the Pinto? That was the little car that blew up when it was rear-ended.
There is no Pinto now. That isn't because Ford said: "We're sorry! We had no idea that
our cars would burn people up! We'll stop making them." In fact what Ford executives
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intended for citizens to benefit from the FAA's enactment, but large
corporations have used their legal, financial, and political resources to
turn the FAA into a shield against consumer lawsuits. Thus, consum-
ers have been unprotected, denied the use of the judicial system, and
deprived of effective weapons to fight companies when disputes arise.
Part II of this Comment will review the FAA and its influence on
the enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer con-
tracts. 22 In addition, this part will outline the development of case law
which has addressed arbitration clauses since the enactment of the
FAA. Supreme Court cases have addressed arbitration clauses in gen-
eral, and lower court cases have addressed issues of notice and con-
sent in the enforceability of arbitration agreements. 23 Part III will
analyze how the FAA can protect corporations that abuse consumers
and the threat that mandatory arbitration poses to common law con-
sumer protection.24 Part III will also examine the issue of consumers
contractually waiving their rights to use the judicial system without
being given adequate notice or knowledge and further explore the fac-
tors that courts consider in deciding whether adequate notice and con-
sent exist.25 In addition, Part III will question the disparity in the
procedural protection of consumers disputes resolved in arbitration
and those resolved in the judicial system. 26 Part IV will address the
impact of mandatory arbitration clauses on remedies available to con-
sumers, the deterrence of future harm to consumers by corporations, 27
and the burden that mandatory arbitration clauses place on the judi-
cial system. 28 Further, Part IV will suggest methods that consumers
can use to oppose the enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses29
and propose that Congress create legislation to reduce the FAA's neg-
ative impact on consumer protection.30 Part V will conclude that con-
did say was chilling: they said . . . "Let 'em burn. It's cheaper to pay off the victims
than retool the car .... The government couldn't get the Pinto off the road. Not the
President. Not the Congress. Not the auto industry. But the jury did it .... David
picked up five smooth stones. That's all he had, except righteousness, to bring the giant
down to size. The Jury is the individuals' smooth stones to deliver justice against the
giants of industry.
Jim McMillen, An Argument Against Arbitration, THE CONSUMER AI)VOCATE. Nov./Dec. 1999,
at 35.
22. See infra notes 32-227 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 32-227 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 228-306 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 228-306 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 228-306 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 306-399 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 306-399 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 306-399 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 306-399 and accompanying text.
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sumers are harmed when they unknowingly waive their rights to use
the judicial system and that they should be protected from mandatory
arbitration clauses.31
II. BACKGROUND
In deciding whether to enforce arbitration clauses in consumer con-
tracts, courts take into consideration both the statutory mandate of
the FAA and common consumer law precedent.
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
Before the founding of the United States, the English judiciary
demonstrated a hostility toward out of court arbitration. 32 This hostil-
ity carried over to the United States judiciary as evidenced by the ju-
dicial practice of failing to mandate specific performance of
contractual agreements, arbitrate, or stay judicial proceedings so that
the dispute may be arbitrated according to the contract.33 Lower fed-
eral courts have expressed a desire to enforce arbitration clauses, but
have declined to do so because of strong precedent finding arbitration
clauses unenforceable. 34 Further, courts have expressed that they
would not avoid precedent against enforcing arbitration clauses with-
out legislative enactment. 35
In 1925, Congress reacted to the judiciary's plea for legislation and
passed the FAA in an attempt to counteract the traditional judicial
hostility toward arbitration agreements. 36 The congressional report
for the FAA states in part:
[t]he courts [have] felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to
be overturned without legislative enactment, although they have
frequently criticized the rule [that arbitration agreements should
not be strictly enforced] and recognized its illogical nature and the
injustice which results from it. The bill declares simply that such
agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a proce-
dure in the Federal courts for their enforcement. 37
31. See infra notes 399-404 and accompanying text.
32. Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. Arntorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-88 (2d Cir.
1942) (explaining in detail the traditional judicial attitude toward the arbitration of disputes).
33. Id. at 984.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp., 5)0 U.S. 20, 25 (1991) (stating that "[the
FAA's] purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that
has existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts..
37. See Kulkundis Shipping Co., 126 F.2d at 985.
11.96 [Vol. 50:1.191
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Thus, the FAA was created to place arbitration agreements on equal
par with other contractual agreements. 3 8 The FAA states in relevant
part:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agree-
ment in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy aris-
ing out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.3 9
The subsequent legislative history implies that the congressional in-
tent behind the FAA was to insure that arbitration clauses, and other
terms agreed to by private parties in written contracts, would be en-
forced in accordance with the parties' intentions.40 Legislative history
also implies that, in enacting the FAA, Congress wanted to provide
for the expeditious resolution of disputes and to relieve congestion in
the courts.41 Nevertheless, legislative opinions have begun to reject
this idea and have reaffirmed the notion that the overriding congres-
sional intent behind the FAA was not to provide parties with an alter-
native to litigation, but rather to ensure judicial enforcement of
private agreements. 42
The FAA implements a national policy favoring arbitration and
withdraws a state's power to deny arbitration when the litigation in-
volves interstate commerce and is brought under state court jurisdic-
tion. 43 Nevertheless, if contracts include a choice-of-law provision
allowing disputes arising out of the contract to be decided under the
38. Id. (stating that the FAA was created to "place arbitration agreements upon the same
footing as other contracts"); McMahon 482 U.S. at 226; Standard Magnesium Corp. v. Fuchs, 251
F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1957).
39. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1925). The FAA applies to all transactions involving interstate commerce
and all maritime transactions. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1925).
40. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985) (stating that Congres-
sional intent in enacting the FAA was the "desire to enforce agreements into which parties had
entered"). See also First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995) (naming the basic objective
in the area of commercial arbitration as not quick dispute resolution, but enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements according to their terms and the intentions of the parties); Paint Corp. v. Flood
& Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Inc. Co.,
867 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1989); Germany v. River T. R. Co., 477 F.2d 546 (6th Cir. 1973); URS
Company-Kansas City v. Titus County Hosp. Dist., 604 F. Supp. 423 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
41. O.R. Sec. v. Professional Assocs., 857 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1988); Germany. 477 F.2d at 546;
United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 597 P.2d 290 (1979).
42. First Options, 514 U.S. at 945; Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 891 (2d Cir.
1985).
43. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (referring to the national policy
created by 9 U.S.C. § 2, requiring states to favor enforcement of arbitration agreements).
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law of a particular state, then state law may not be pre-empted by the
FAA.44
B. Enforceability of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in
Common Law
Consumer plaintiffs argue that their particular agreement to arbi-
trate is not enforceable under the FAA. 45 Specific consumer claims of
contract unenforceability have been brought in lower courts which re-
main split on several issues regarding the enforceability of arbitration
clauses in particular circumstances. 46 However, the courts have used
the FAA for support to stay litigation and compel arbitration in dis-
putes regarding contracts that contained mandatory arbitration
clauses. 47
1. The United States Supreme Court and the Enforceability of
Arbitration Agreements Under the FAA
a. Wilko v. Swan, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahan, &
Rodriguez DeQuijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.:
The Evolution of the Supreme Court's Interpretation
of Congressional Intent in Enacting the FAA
In 1953, the Supreme Court ruled on the enforceability of an arbi-
tration clause. 48 In Wilko v. Swan, the plaintiff brought a suit in the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York under
the Securities Act of 193349 (Securities Act). 50 The defendant moved
to stay the trial under the FAA because the terms of the contractual
agreement between the parties included an arbitration clause that
mandated arbitration at the request of either party.5' The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied
the motion to stay the trial and held that the arbitration agreement
44. See Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 474-77 (1989) (enforcing
a contract under California law when the terms of the contract included a choice-of-law provi-
sion for California law and an arbitration clause).
45. See infra notes 131-227 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 159-227 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 48-61, 177-159 and accompanying text.
48. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-f (1933). The Securities Act of 1933 is a federal statute regulating the
trade of securities in interstate commerce. Id.
51. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 428-29 (1953) (deciding a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 77a-e). In
Swan, the plaintiff was a customer of a security brokerage firm. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendants encouraged him to purchase corporate stock that would go up in value, while
neglecting to tell the plaintiff that they knew that the director and counsel for the corporation
were selling their own shares of stock. Id.
51. Id. at 429.
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deprived the plaintiff of remedies under the Securities Act.52 The Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held that the Securities
Act "did not prohibit the agreement to refer future controversies to
arbitration."5 3
The United States Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of
whether the arbitration clause in the contract was a binding "condi-
tion, stipulation, or provision" in violation of the Act. 54 Additionally,
the Court considered whether arbitrators need to provide a written
opinion and ultimately stated that since "the arbitrators, award may
be without a complete record of their proceedings, the arbitrators'
conception of the legal meaning of such statutory requirements as
'burden of proof,' 'reasonable care' or 'material fact,' . . . cannot be
examined. ' '55 The Court held that Congress intended to void any
waiver of a judicial trial and held that the arbitration clause was
invalid.5 6
In reaching its decision, the Court examined the arbitrators' role in
the enforceability of mandatory arbitration clauses and recognized
that, while arbitrators may base the parties' award on legal require-
ments, statutes, or common law, the arbitration agreement "has no
requirement that arbitrators follow the law."'57
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court questioned whether the
holding in Swan should be extended to invalidate arbitration clauses
for claims brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which
was substantively similar to the Securities Act. 58 The critical decisions
52. Id. at 430.
53. Id.
54. Id. In deciding whether the arbitration clause effectively waived compliance with the Se-
curities Act, the Court took into consideration a special right of the buyer created by the Act,
which placed the burden of proof on the seller. Id. at 431. The Court implied that compliance
with this special right could only be ensured in a judicial forum. Id. The Court also looked at
the benefits a buyer of securities has in federal court, including a "wide choice of venue, nation-
wide service of process," and the inapplicability of the "jurisdictional $3,000 requirement of di-
versity cases." Id.
55. Id. at 436 (citations omitted).
56. Swan, 346 U.S. at 431-34. The Court determined that the congressional intent behind the
creation of the Securities Act was "to put buyers of securities covered by that Act on a different
basis from other purchasers." Id. at 435. The Court continued to state that "[wlhen the security
buyer, prior to any violation of the Securities Act, waives his right to sue in courts, he gives up
more than would a participant in other business transactions." Id. at 437-38. The Court stated
that "the protective provisions of the Securities Act require the exercise of judicial direction to
fairly assure their effectiveness, [and] it seems to us that Congress must have intended the lan-
guage in the Act declaring void any terms that waive compliance with the Act], to apply to
waiver of judicial trial and review." Id. at 437.
57. Id. at 434.
58. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 220 (addressing the issue of whether compulsory arbitration
under an arbitration agreement arising out of the Securities Act should also be used when the
2001] 1199
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in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon59 and Rodriguez De
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.60 brought about the turning
point, which eventually led to the abandonment of Swan.6'
In McMahon, the plaintiffs raised claims under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 193462 (Exchange Act), 63 thereby inducing the Supreme
Court to address the issue of whether congressional intent in passing
the Exchange Act precluded the enforcement of a mandatory arbitra-
tion clause. 64 In McMahon, the Court acknowledged that the Securi-
ties Act and the Exchange Act were similar in both language and
substance, yet it did not follow its decision in Swan to invalidate the
arbitration clause. 65
The Court held that the arbitration clause was enforceable in light
of congressional intent behind the Exchange Act and in light of
changes that have occurred since Swan: "the mistrust of arbitration
that formed the basis for the [Swan] opinion in 1953 is difficult to
square with the assessment of arbitration that has prevailed since that
dispute arises out of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). See also infra notes 63-68 and accom-
panying text.
59. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
60. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
61. Id. at 484-86.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1933). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits sellers of securi-
ties from engaging in fraud in trading stock for buyers and misrepresenting or omitting material
facts in giving advice to buyers of securities. Id.
63. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 222. The plaintiffs also raised a claim under the Racketeer Influ-
ence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994). Id. at 227. The Supreme
Court held that congressional intent in passing RICO did not preclude the enforcement of a
mandatory arbitration clause. Id. at 242. The Court found that "RICO's text and legislative
history fail to reveal any intent to override the provisions of the Arbitration Act, [and] the
McMahons must argue that there is an irreconcilable conflict between arbitration and RICO's
underlying purposes." Id. at 239. The McMahons argued that an irreconcilable conflict existed
between RICO and arbitration under several different theories, none of which the Court found
compelling. Id. The Court's decision focused on three arguments made by the plaintiffs: (1)
RICO claims are too complex for arbitration; (2) since RICO contains overlapping civil and
criminal provisions, violations should not be arbitrated; and (3) it is against public interest to
submit RICO claims to arbitration. Id. at 239-40. The Court rejected all of these arguments and
relied on its decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. McMahon, 482
U.S. at 239-40. In Mitsubishi, the Court held that "nothing in the nature of the federal antitrust
laws prohibits parties from agreeing to arbitrate antitrust claims arising out of international com-
mercial transactions." Id. at 239 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985)). In comparing RICO with antitrust laws, the Court found that both
types of laws were complex, both simultaneously include civil and criminal provisions, and both
contain remedial and deterrent functions. Id. at 239-40 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985)). Due to these similarities between antitrust
laws and RICO, the Court held that it must follow the decision it made in Mitsubishi, and en-
force the mandatory arbitration clause in McMahon. Id. at 241-42.
64. Id. at 227-37.
65. Id.
1200
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time."'66 The Court further justified its decision by interpreting the
Swan holding to bar "waiver[s] of judicial forum ... only where arbi-
tration is inadequate to protect substantive rights at issue."'67 Thus,
the Court held that arbitration was a suitable forum to protect sub-
stantive rights under the Exchange Act.68
Two years after McMahon, the Court once again addressed the is-
sue of whether the Swan decision was considered good law. In Rodri-
guez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,69 the plaintiffs,
pleaded violations of both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act,
thus forcing the Court to decide whether to enforce or to invalidate an
arbitration clause that they had signed.70 The Court found that the
"right to select the judicial forum and the wider choice of courts are
not ... so critical that they cannot be waived under the rationale that
the Securities Act was intended to place buyers of securities on an
equal footing with sellers."'71 The Court directly overturned Swan and
stated, "[w]e now conclude that [Swan] was incorrectly decided and is
inconsistent with the prevailing uniform construction of other federal
statutes governing arbitration agreements in the setting of business
transactions ' 72 and held that the arbitration clause was enforceable
for both claims under the Exchange Act and the Securities Act.73
66. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233. The Court also looked at its prior decision in Scherk v. Al-
berto-Culver Co. Id. at 229 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 806 (1974)). "In
Scherk, the Court upheld enforcement of a predispute agreement to arbitrate Exchange Act
claims by parties to an international contract." Id. (emphasis added). The Court in Scherk
reasoned that arbitration was an adequate substitute for judicial resolution of disputes arising
out of international contracts. Id. The Court in McMahon took this reasoning one step further
to find that arbitration was an adequate substitute in the judicial forum in the resolution of any
claim arising under the Exchange Act. Id. at 232-38.
67. Id. at 239.
68. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232.
69. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
70. Id. 490 U.S. at 478-79 (stating the claims raised by the plaintiff). Following the Swan
decision, the Court would have had to invalidate the arbitration clause for the Securities Act
claim and enforce the arbitration clause for the Exchange Act claim. See supra notes 48-57 and
accompanying text. Since the two Acts were so similar, the Court was placed in the precarious
position of either splitting the claims, sending one to arbitration and one to a judicial trial, or
sending both claims to the same forum for resolution, which it could accomplish only by over-
turning one of its prior decisions.
71. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 481.
72. Id. at 484. The Court also stated:
[i]t also would be undesirable for the decisions in [Swan] and McMahon to continue to
exist side by side .... [T]he inconsistency between [Swan] and McMahon undermines
the essential rationale for a harmonious construction of the two statutes, which is to
discourage litigants from manipulating their allegations merely to cast their claims
under one of the securities laws rather than another. For all of these reasons, therefore.
we overrule the decision in [Swan].
Id. at 484-85 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 482-85.
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b. Perry v. Thomas
In Perry v. Thomas,7 4 the United States Supreme Court decided
whether the FAA, coupled with a contractual agreement to arbitrate
all disputes, pre-empted state law which guaranteed judicial resolution
of certain disputes. 75 In Perry, the plaintiff sued his former employer
and two former co-employees for securities sales commissions. 76 The
plaintiff executed an agreement to arbitrate all disputes with his em-
ployer as part of his employment contract. 77 The plaintiff contended
that he was entitled to litigate his dispute under the California Labor
Code, 78 which provided that private agreements to arbitrate claims do
not preclude any action for wage collection. 79 The defendant, citing
the arbitration agreement, filed a motion to compel arbitration.8 0 The
Court held that under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution,8' the FAA pre-empted the California state law which
guaranteed a trial for employee compensation claims. 82
c. Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the
Leland Stanford Junior University
In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland
Stanford Junior University,8 3 the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether a California state law was pre-empted by
the FAA. 4 In Volt, Stanford University brought suit against Volt for
74. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 483.
77. Id.
78. CAL. LAB. CoDE ANN. § 229 (West 1971).
79. Perry, 482 U.S. at 484. "[Tlhe California Labor Code ... provides that actions for the
collection of wages may be maintained 'without regard to the existence of any private agreement
to arbitrate.'" Id.
80. Id. at 485.
81. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding").
82. Perry, 482 U.S. at 483. The Court relied on its previous decision in Southland Corp. v.
Keating, which held that the FAA pre-empted a California Franchise Investment Law which
required judicial review of claims under that law. Id. at 489. In Keating, the Court stated that in
enacting the FAA, "Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the
power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting
parties agreed to resolve by arbitration." Id.
83. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
84. Id. The dispute arose from a contract entered into by both parties containing a choice of
law provision for California law to govern disputes arising out of that contract. Id. at 470. The
issue was whether to apply the California Arbitration Act or the FAA in enforcing an arbitration
clause in the agreement. Id. (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)).
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fraud and breach of contract and sought indemnity from two other
parties with which it contracted in a construction project. 85 Volt mo-
tioned to compel arbitration under an arbitration agreement in the
construction contract and Stanford motioned to stay arbitration pend-
ing the resolution of the dispute between Stanford and the other two
defendants, who were not parties to the arbitration agreement.8 6 An
additional clause in the construction contract provided the choice of
law by stating "[t]he Contract shall be governed by the law of the
place where the Project is located. '87
The Court found that the choice of law provision allowed the dis-
pute to be arbitrated under the California Arbitration Act 88 even
though the contract involved interstate commerce. 89 Under the Cali-
fornia Arbitration Act, a court is allowed to stay arbitration until all
related litigation not subject to the arbitration agreement is re-
solved.90 The Court held that the "FAA does not confer a right to
compel arbitration of any dispute at any time; it confers only the right
to obtain an order directing that 'arbitration proceed in the manner
provided for in [the parties'] agreement."'91 Since the contract in-
cluded a choice of law provision, and the FAA requires the enforce-
ment of the contract as agreed to by both parties, the arbitration
clause was subject to California law; therefore, the California Arbitra-
tion Act applied, allowing for a stay of arbitration pending related
disputes.92
d. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation,93 the plaintiff
claimed that the defendant violated his rights under the Age Discrimi-
85. Id. at 468.
86. Id. at 471. The arbitration clause stated:
All claims, disputes and other matters in question between the parties to this contract.
arising out of or relating to this contract or the breach thereof, shall be decided by
arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association then prevailing unless the parties mutually agreed
[sic] otherwise .... This agreement to arbitrate . . . shall be specifically enforceable
under the prevailing arbitration law.
Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 470 n.l (1989) (quoting the parties'
original contract) (alteration in original).
87. Id. at 470 (citing the arbitration clause agreed to by Volt and Stanford).
88. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 1280 et. seq. (West 1982).
89. Volt, 489 U.S. at 472-73.
90. Id. at 470. While the California Arbitration Act allows a stay of arbitration until the reso-
lution of related disputes pending litigation, the FAA contains no such provision. Id. at 470-72.
91. Id. at 474-75 (emphasis in original).
92. Id. at 476-77.
93. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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nation in Employment Act of 196794 (ADEA). 95  The defendant
moved to compel arbitration of the dispute under an agreement that
Gilmer signed with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 96 which
provided that any disagreement arising out of termination of employ-
ment between a member organization and a securities representative
must be arbitrated. 97 In examining the issues, the Court acknowl-
edged that "statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration
agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA" 98 and recognized that
an exception to compel arbitration of statutory rights under the FAA
existed when Congress intended "to preclude waiver of judicial reme-
dies" in enacting the statute. 99
The Court stated two reasons for rejecting Gilmer's argument that
the compelled arbitration would undermine the enforcement of the
ADEA. 10 1 First, the Court recognized that the employee could file a
claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
even if the dispute were subject to compelled arbitration. 10 1 Second,
the EEOC could combat age discrimination, even if the employee did
not file a charge. 10 2 The Court found that "Congress ... did not ex-
plicitly preclude arbitration or other nonjudicial resolution of claims,
94. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et. seq. (1990)).
95. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20. The burden is placed on the party opposing arbitration to prove
congressional intent to preclude waiver of judicial forum for ADEA disputes. Id. at 26. The
Court justified placing the burden of proof on Gilmer as support for its policy on holding parties
to agreements to arbitrate for what they bargained. id. The limit that the Court put on this
policy was what Congress itself intended to prohibit waiver of a judicial remedy of particular
statutory rights. Id. Under the ADEA. an employee must first file a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and wait sixty days before filing a claim under
the ADEA. Id. at 27 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)). Before the EEOC can sue the employer, it
must afford the employer a chance to voluntarily comply with the ADEA. Id. at 27 (citing 29
U.S.C. §§ 626(b)). If the EEOC institutes a lawsuit within the sixty day period, then the individ-
ual's right to sue is eliminated. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27.
96. Id. at 24. Gilmer was required to register as a securities representative as a condition of
his employment. Id. The agreement in question was an application for registration with the
New York Stock Exchange. Id.
97. Id. at 23. The registration agreement stated that disputes must be arbitrated under the
rules of the organization with which a party registered. Id. at 23. Since Gilmer was registering
with the NYSE, the NYSE rules on arbitration applied. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23. The Court
identified the relevant rule and stated that "NYSE Rule 347 provides for arbitration of '[a]ny
controversy between a registered representative and any member or member organization aris-
ing out of the employment or termination of employment of such registered representative.'" Id.
(quoting App. to Brief for Respondent 1) (alteration in original).
98. Id. at 26.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 28.
101. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28. The Court pointed out the fact that Gilmer filed a charge with the
EEOC in the present case. Id.
102. Id. The EEOC may investigate age discrimination pursuant to information that it re-
ceives from any source. Id.
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even in its recent amendments to the ADEA."'0 3 Thus, out of court
arbitration of disputes were consistent with congressional intent of the
ADEA because the requirement of attempting to resolve disputes, us-
ing the EEOC, was directed at pursuing informal methods of dispute
resolution.10 4 Furthermore the Court rejected Gilmer's argument that
arbitration stifles the development of law, by not requiring the arbitra-
tor to issue a written opinion, because the NYSE rules do require the
arbitrator to reduce awards to writing1t °5 The Court rejected the ar-
gument that Gilmer had unequal bargaining power against the em-
ployer in arbitrating the dispute,10 6 thus stating that "[m]ere inequality
in bargaining power ... is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitra-
tion agreements are never enforceable in the employment context."'
' 0 7
The Court considered the fact that Gilmer was an experienced busi-
ness man but left open the issue as to whether a claim of unequal
bargaining power should succeed in more specific cases.t °8 The Court
concluded that Gilmer did not meet his burden of proof that the arbi-
tration clause was contrary to congressional intent and affirmed the
order compelling arbitration. 0 9
e. Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson
The scope of the FAA was examined by the United States Supreme
Court in Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson." 0 In Al-
lied-Bruce, the dispute involved a contract for termite extermination
103. Id. at 29.
104. Id.
105. Gilmer. 500 U.S. at 31-32. The NYSE rules require that the arbitrator issue a written
opinion which includes the awards, the parties' names, and a summary of the issues. id.
106. Id. at 32-33.
107. Id. at 33. The Court supported its position that unequal bargaining power is not enough
to invalidate an arbitration clause with its decision in Rodriguez. Id. The Court drew a parallel
between securities dealers and investors, such as the parties in Rodriguez, and employers and
employees, such as in the instant case. Id. See also supra notes 70-70 and accompanying text.
108. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
109. Id. at 35. In his dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the FAA should not apply
to employment contracts at all and that the registration agreement in the present case was essen-
tially an employment contract. Id. at 40. (Stevens, J., dissenting). In making this argument,
Justice Stevens cited a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee's hearing on the pro-
posed bill for the FAA. Id. at 39. Justice Stevens quoted the testimony from the hearing of the
chairman of the American Bar Association committee which drafted the bill, stating
that the bill "is not intended [to] be an act referring to labor disputes, at all. It is purely
an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing with
each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do it. Now that is all there is in
this."
Id. at 39 (quoting Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a subcommittee of the Senate Commit-
tee of the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 9 (1923)) (alteration in original).
110. 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995).
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which included a clause requiring controversies to be arbitrated.t"'
The Alabama Supreme Court held that state law applied to the case,
not the FAA." 12 The lower court found that "the connection between
the termite contract and interstate commerce was too slight" to fall
under the FAA because the parties did not contemplate a transaction
involving interstate commerce when entering into the agreement. 1 3
The court examined the language of the FAA which stated that courts
should enforce "a contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction . . . . ,,14
The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower court's find-
ings and held that the "contemplation of the parties" interpretation of
the contract is anomalous to the purpose of the FAA because litigat-
ing the ambiguity of what the parties "contemplated" defeats the pur-
pose of the FAA.' 1 5 The Court found that the language of the FAA
should be interpreted broadly to include within its scope the full reach
of the Commerce Clause and any transaction affecting interstate com-
merce, rather than what the parties specifically contemplated. t1 6
111. Id. at 268. "The Plan's contract document provided in writing that 'any controversy or
claim ... arising out of or relating to the interpretation, performance or breach of any provision
of this agreement shall be settled exclusively by arbitration.'" Id. (quoting the record for the
applicable contract language) (emphasis in original).
112. Id. at 269. A state statute invalidated predispute arbitration agreements. Id.
113. Id. at 273 (emphasis omitted).
114. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 269.
115. Id. at 278.
116. Id. at 274-77. The Court also addressed the fact that the FAA contains a provision re-
stricting states from regulating arbitration clauses by themselves. Id. at 281. The provision re-
quires any regulation of arbitration clauses to fall under regulation of contracts in general, so
that arbitration clauses are on equal footing with other contract clauses. Id.
The Allied-Bruce holding was questioned by the Texas Courts of Appeals in L & L Kempwood
Associated, L.P. v. Omega Builders, Inc., 972 S.W. 2d 819 (Tex. App. 1998). The court in Omega
Builders tried to reconcile the Supreme Court's decision in Allied-Bruce, with its subsequent
decision in U.S. v. Lopez. Id. at 821. The court cited the Allied-Bruce decision, which set forth a
test that broadly interpreted the commerce clause, allowing Congress' power to regulate inter-
state commerce to be extended to anything affecting interstate commerce. Id. The court cited
Lopez, which established a test for the reach of the commerce clause to extend only to the
regulation of that which substantially affects interstate commerce. Id. The court in Omega
Builders had trouble reconciling the two Supreme Court decisions. Id. Like Allied-Bruce,
Omega Builders involved an arbitration clause in a contract, whereas Lopez involved a criminal
statute. Id. at 821-22. The court in Omega Builders rejected the Allied-Bruce test and stated that
"it seems to us unmistakable that the rule stated in Lopez does supplant Allied-Bruce, and we
are bound to apply Lopez and its 'substantially affect' test." L & L Kempwood Associated, L.P.,
972 S.W. 2d at 821.
The Allied-Bruce decision was criticized by the Alabama Supreme Court in Coastal Ford, Inc.
v. Kidder, where the court explained that since the Supreme Court overturned the Alabama
Supreme Court test of whether the parties contemplated interstate activity, it was obligated to
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f. Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto
In Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,17 involved the issue of
whether a state law that required specific notice be given, when an
arbitration clause is included in a contract, was inconsistent with the
FAA. 1 8  The petitioner's motion to compel arbitration under a
mandatory arbitration clause was denied by the Montana Supreme
Court because the contract did not meet the state's requirement that
"[n]otice that [the] contract is subject to arbitration" must be "typed
in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract."' 9 The
Montana Supreme Court found that the notice requirement did not
undermine the goals of the FAA because it did not preclude arbitra-
tion agreements, but rather ensured that the agreement to arbitrate
was entered into knowingly, before the agreement could be
enforceable.120
The United States Supreme Court declared that state law can only
be used to invalidate arbitration clauses if state law applied to the
whole contract, including claims of fraud, duress, or unconscionabil-
ity.t21 The Court stated that "[clourts may not, however, invalidate
arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration
provisions."1 22 Therefore, since the notice requirement under Mon-
tana law only applied to arbitration agreements, the Court held that
"[t]he FAA thus displace[d] the Montana statute with respect to arbi-
tration agreements covered by the Act."1 23 The Montana law was
held invalid under the FAA, and the arbitration clause was, conse-
quently, enforceable under the FAA, without meeting the notice
requirement. 124
apply the new Supreme Court test for interstate commerce "in fact" in order to determine
whether the FAA was binding on those parties. 694 So. 2d 1285, 1287 (Ala. 1997).
117. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
118. Id. at 683.
119. Id. (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (West 1995)) (alteration in original). The
dispute in this case arose out of a franchise agreement which permitted the respondent to open a
Subway sandwich shop. Id. "The franchise agreement stated, on page nine and in ordinary type:
'Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract or the breach thereof shall be
settled by Arbitration . I...' ld. (citing the record for language in the disputed contract).
120. Id. at 685.
121. Doctor's Assocs., Inc., 517 U.S. at 686-87.
122. Id. at 687 (emphasis in original).
123. Id. at 687.
124. Id. at 687-89. Justice Thomas dissented, claiming that Section 2 of FAA, which prohibits
states from singling out arbitration clauses in their contract law, does not apply when the pro-
ceedings are in state court. Id. at 689.
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g. First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan
In First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan,'25 the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether a court or the arbitrator has the
authority to decide whether parties must submit a dispute to arbitra-
tion pursuant to a contractual arbitration clause. 2 6 The Court found
that arbitration is a matter of contract between two parties and that a
reviewing court must apply state laws governing the formation of con-
tracts. 127 The Court emphasized that a party should not be forced to
submit to arbitration unless that party specifically agreed to arbitrate
the disputed issues. 128 Thus, determining whether the parties agreed
to arbitrate, the Court stated that "[c]ourts should not assume that the
parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is 'clear and un-
mistakable' evidence that they did so. '' 129 The Court held that arbitra-
tion was subject to independent review by the courts because Kaplan
did not clearly agree to arbitrate due to the fact that he did not sign
the arbitration agreement, and his only submission to arbitration was
a memorandum objecting to the arbitrator's decision.' 30
h. Green Tree Financial Corporation v. Randolph
In Green Tree Financial Corporation v. Randolph,'3' the United
States Supreme Court addressed the issue of the enforceability of an
arbitration clause in a consumer contract. 132 In Green Tree, the plain-
tiff financed the purchase of her mobile home with a loan issued by
Green Tree Financial Corporation. 33 Randolph's contract with
Green Tree required that she purchase "Vendor's Single Interest in-
surance," to protect Green Tree's interest in the event of a default. 34
The contract also included an arbitration clause, which mandated that
"all disputes arising from, or relating to, the contract, whether arising
under case law or statutory law, would be resolved by binding arbitra-
tion." 35 Randolph filed a class action lawsuit, alleging that Green
125. 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
126. Id. at 942-43.
127. Id. at 944.
128. Id. at 945.
129. Id. at 944 (citing AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643
(1986)).
130. Id. at 946-47.
131. 121 S. Ct. 513 (2000).
132. Id. at 517.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 517-18.
135. Id. at 518. The arbitration clause stated
All disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this Contract or the
relationships which result from this Contract, or the validity of this arbitration clause or
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Tree violated the Truth in Lending Act 136 by failing to disclose the
cost of the Vendor's Single Interest insurance as a finance charge for
the loan. 137 Randolph also alleged that Green Tree violated the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act 138 by forcing Randolph to arbitrate her statu-
tory causes of action as a condition for the loan. 139
The District Court for the Middle District of Alabama granted
Green Tree's motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration
clause in the parties' contract. 40 Randolph filed a motion for recon-
sideration and claimed that she may have to drop the lawsuit because
she could not financially afford to arbitrate her claims. 141 The court
subsequently denied the motion.142 Thereafter, Randolph appealed 43
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which
held that it had jurisdiction to review the decision. 144 The court relied
on a provision in the FAA which allows for appeal from "a final deci-
sion with respect to an arbitration that is subject to [the FAA]."' 145
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the arbitration clause
was invalid under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), since it failed to
the entire contract, shall be resolved by binding arbitration by one arbitrator selected
by Assignee with consent of Buyer(s). This arbitration Contract is made pursuant to a
transaction in interstate commerce, and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration
Act at 9 U.S.C. Section 1. Judgment upon the award rendered may be entered in any
court having jurisdiction. The parties agree and understand that they choose arbitra-
tion instead of litigation to resolve disputes. The parties understand that they have a
right or opportunity to litigate disputes through a court, but that they prefer to resolve
their disputes through arbitration, except as provided herein. THE PARTIES VOL-
UNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE ANY RIGHT THEY HAVE TO A JURY
TRIAL EITHER PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION UNDER THIS CLAUSE OR
PURSUANT TO A COURT ACTION BY ASSIGNEE (AS PROVIDED HEREIN).
The parties agree and understand that all disputes arising under case law, statutory law,
and all other laws, including, but not limited to, all contract, tort, and property disputes
will be subject to binding arbitration in accord with this Contract. The parties agree
and understand that the arbitrator shall have all powers provided by the law and the
Contract.
Id. at 518 n.1 (emphasis in original).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1997).
137. Green Tree, 121 S. Ct. at 518.
138. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1997).




143. Randolph v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 178 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 1999).
144. Id. at 1156-57. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that it had jurisdiction to
review the lower court's decision rather than order mandatory arbitration of the matter, because
the district court's order was a final decision. Id. at 1157. The Eleventh Circuit also held that the
district court's order was final because it disposed of all issues and left nothing to be done but
execute the order. Id. at 1156-57.
145. Id. at 1152-57.
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provide the statutory protections of the Act, including the disclosure
of filing fees for the arbitration, the arbitrator's costs, and any addi-
tional arbitration expenses which may prevent the plaintiff from en-
forcing her rights. 146 Green Tree appealed.147
The United States Supreme Court examined whether the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals had jurisdiction under the FAA to decide
the issues. 148 The Court recognized that the FAA preserves interlocu-
tory appeal of any "'final decision with respect to an arbitration,' re-
gardless of whether the decision is favorable or hostile to
arbitration.' 1 49 The Court also recognized that the FAA failed to de-
fine a "final decision," and held that the traditional definition of a
final decision is "a decision that 'ends the litigation on the merits and
leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.'1 50
Therefore, the Court found that the Eleventh Circuit Court correctly
held that it had jurisdiction to decide the appeal. 15'
In addition the Court addressed whether the arbitration clause was
unenforceable because it failed to disclose all of the costs of arbitra-
tion which Randolph would have to pay in order to seek relief under
federal statutes. 52 The Court offered a two part test to determine
whether federal statutory claims may be resolved through arbitra-
tion. 53 The Court determined that an arbitration clause is enforcea-
ble if the plaintiff claims that her statutory rights have been violated
when: (1) the parties agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration
and (2) there is no evidence that Congress intended "to preclude a
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."' 154
The Court found that the first part of the test was satisfied because
it was undisputed that the parties agreed to arbitrate their disputes. 55
Second, the Court held that Randolph did not claim that Congress
intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies enacting TILA;
rather, Randolph argued that, under the contract, she bore a risk that
she would not be able to seek relief from Green Tree's violations of
the TILA since the costs of arbitration may have been too great for
146. Id. at 1157-58.
147. Green Tree, 121 S. Ct. 513.
148. Id. at 519-521.
149. Id. at 519.
150. Id. (quoting Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 868, 867 (1994)
and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978)).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 521.
153. Green Tree, 121 S. Ct. at 521.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 521-22.
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her to afford. 56 However, the Court found that Randolph provided
no evidence as to the actual costs of arbitration and whether those
costs were actually prohibitive to her filing a dispute. 157
2. The Issue of Notice and Consent in the Enforceability of
Arbitration Agreements Addressed by Lower Courts
While the Supreme Court has yet to address the issues of notice and
consent regarding the enforceability of arbitration clauses, lower
courts have addressed these issues in variety of different situations
including: (a) arbitration clauses which were not included in the origi-
nal contract, but later added pursuant to a change-in-terms clause in
the original agreement; and (b) adequate consent or notice of the ar-
bitration agreement by one party.
a. Arbitration Clauses Added Pursuant to a Change-in-Terms
Clause in the Original Agreement
Lower courts in various jurisdictions are split on the issue of
whether to enforce mandatory arbitration clauses that are added to a
contract after the original date of execution pursuant to a change-in-
terms clause. 58 Three cases which have come down on different sides
of this issue are Badie v. Bank of America,159 Stiles v. Home Cable
Concepts, Inc., 60 and Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley. 16 1
156. Id. at 522.
157. Id. The Court recognized that Randolph's motion claimed that the American Arbitra-
tion Association (AAA) charged a $500 filing fee for a claim under $10,000, plus an average of
$700 per day in arbitrator's fees. Id. at 522 n.6. The Court criticized Randolph for failing to
provide proof of the $500 fee and for only providing an article published by the Bureau of
National Affairs which quotes a "stray statement" of an executive of the American Arbitration
Association, as proof for the $700 in fees. Green Tree, 121 S. Ct. at 522 n.6. The Court further
criticized Randolph for using the AAA as an example of costs, without proving that the parties
would actually use the AAA to arbitrate their dispute. Id. The Court determined that the per-
son seeking to invalidate an arbitration clause bears the burden of showing the likelihood of
incurring costs of arbitration that would be prohibitively expensive. Id. at 522. The Court held
that Randolph failed to meet this burden. Id. The Court stated that "[tihe 'risk' that Randolph
will be saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitra-
tion agreement." Id.
158. A change-in-terms clause is a clause in the original agreement between the parties which
gives one party the unilateral right to modify the agreement after it has been entered into. See
Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 277 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
159. Id. at 273.
160. 994 F. Supp. 1410 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
161. 743 So. 2d 570 (Ct. App. Fl. 1999).
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i. Badie v. Bank of America
In Badie, the California Court of Appeal held that a mandatory ar-
bitration clause sent through the mail to a customer pursuant to a
change-in-terms agreement, included in the original contract was un-
enforceable.1 62 The bank in Badie sent the arbitration clause on a
piece of paper, a "stuffer," that was stuffed in the envelope with an
account bill. 163 The bank sent the stuffer to all of its customers of
BankAmerica Visa, MasterCard, Visa Gold, Gold MasterCard, and
Appolo Accounts. 64 The stuffer stated that the arbitration process
would "take the place of a trial before a judge and jury," and that if
the arbitration provision was new to an account, it would apply to all
future and past transactions if the customer continued to use the ac-
count. 165 The bank relied on the change-in-terms clause in sending
and attempting to enforce the arbitration agreement. 66
The bank had created various change-in-terms agreement over time
and for various different types of credit cards. 167 One version of the
change-in-terms clause permitted the bank to subsequently add terms
to the agreement. However, the court explained that the provision
allowing the bank to add terms was not in affect for any of the ver-
sions of the change-in-terms clauses at the time the stuffer was sent
out.168
Four individual customers and two consumer oriented groups sued
the bank to enjoin implementation of the arbitration clause.' 69 The
162. Badie, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276-77. In establishing its consumer accounts, the bank in-
cluded a change-in-terms clause in all of its account applications which gave it a unilateral right
to change the terms of the agreement. Id. at 277-78. It relied on this clause in sending and
attempting to enforce the arbitration agreement. Id. at 275.
163. Id. at 276-77.
164. Id. at 277.
165. Id. The arbitration agreement on the stuffer read:
If you or we request, any controversy with us will be decided either by arbitration or
reference. Controversies involving one account, or two or more accounts with at least
one common owner, will be decided by arbitration under the Commercial Arbitration
Rules of the American Arbitration Association. All other controversies will be decided
by a reference under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 638 and related sec-
tions. A referee who is an active attorney or retired judge will be appointed by the
court after selection by the American Arbitration Association using its procedures for
selecting arbitrators. The arbitration or reference will take the place of a trial before a
judge and jury. (This is a new provision for Cardmember and Apollo Account Agree-
ments. If you continue to use your account, this new provision will apply to all past and
future transactions.)
Badie, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 277.
166. Id. at 277-78.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 278.
169. Id. at 275.
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Superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco held that the
arbitration clause was enforceable under the change-in-terms
clause. 170 The California Court of Appeal reversed and held that the
arbitration clause was not enforceable because in receiving the
change-of-terms provision the customers did not intentionally to
waive their rights to a jury trial.17' In addition, the court reasoned
that California's public policy to support Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion Agreements is not so broad as to enforce an agreement that is
entered into without consent from one of the parties.
172
The court examined the scope of the change-in-terms agreement to
determine whether it included the addition of the arbitration clause. 73
The threshold question was whether the scope of the change-in-terms
agreement included the unilateral right of the bank to add new terms
to the agreement or whether the changes-in-terms agreement was lim-
ited to the terms of the original contract. 174 The court concluded that
"when the account agreements were entered into, the parties did not
intend that the change of terms provision should allow the Bank to
add completely new terms such as an Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) clause simply by sending out a notice."' 75 The court held that
"absent a clear agreement to submit disputes to arbitration or some
other form of ADR, we cannot infer that that right to a jury trial has
been waived."' 76
ii. Stiles v. Home Cable Concepts, Inc.
In Stiles v. Home Cable Concepts, Inc.,177 the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Alabama decided whether to enforce
an arbitration clause that was added to a contract pursuant to a
change-in-terms agreement.' 78 The plaintiff opened a charge account
with the defendant in order to purchase a satellite television receiving
170. Id. at 276.
171. Badie, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289-90.
172. Id. at 280. In analyzing the trial court's decision, the court stated:
Whether there is an agreement to submit disputes to arbitration or reference does not
turn on the existence of a public policy favoring ADR, as the trial court apparently
believed. That policy, whose existence we readily acknowledge, does not even come
into play unless it is first determined that the Bank's customers agreed to use some
form of ADR to resolve disputes regarding their deposit and credit card accounts ....
Id. (emphasis in original).
173. id. at 280-81.
174. Id. at 285.
175. Id. at 289.
176. Badie, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290.
177. 994 F. Supp. 1410 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
178. Id. at 1412-13.
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system. 179  Included in the original cardholder agreement was a
change-in-terms agreement which granted the defendant the power to
change the terms of the agreement from time to time, which would be
applicable to the outstanding balance and future transactions. o80 Ap-
proximately four years later, the defendant sent the plaintiff a docu-
ment which stated the new terms of the contract, including a new
mandatory arbitration clause, which waived both parties' rights to use
the judicial system should a dispute arise.""' The plaintiff conceded
that he received the change-in-terms agreement, which included the
arbitration clause, but claimed that he was not aware of the rights that
he was giving up 82 until his attorney explained it to him after a dis-
pute had arisen. 83
The plaintiff argued that the arbitration clause should not be en-
forced because he did not sign it, however, the court held that the
FAA does not require an arbitration clause to be signed in order to be
enforceable. 84 The court reasoned that the plaintiff assented to the
contract as a whole, which included a change-in-terms agreement, and
consequently, the plaintiff assented to the arbitration clause that was
added under the change-in-terms agreement.t8 5 The court found no
merit in the plaintiff's claim that he did not understand the arbitration
clause because "[i]t is a principle of basic contract law that unilateral
mistakes by a party do not invalidate the contract."' 86 Therefore, the
179. Id. at 1412.
180. Id. The change-in-terms agreement from the original credit application stated
14. CHANGES TO THIS AGREEMENT: We may change the terms of this Agree-
ment from time to time and shall give you notice of the changes as required by law.
Such changes may include, without limitation, changes in the monthly periodic rate
(and the corresponding Annual Percentage rate) and changes in the method of comput-
ing Finance Charges. If we do so, such changes will apply to both the outstanding
balance in your Account and future transactions.
i. (quoting the Credit Application from 3-31-94 para. 14).
181. Id. at 1413.
182. Stiles, 994 F. Supp. at 1414.
183. Id. The court discussed whether it should even be deciding whether the arbitration
clause is valid. Id. The court raised the issue that
[ilf a party to an arbitration contract is always able to go to court to dispute the validity
of the arbitration clause, then the benefits of arbitration are, to at least some degree,
lost. In other words, what good is arbitration, if you have [sic] first have to litigate
whether you should arbitrate?
Id. The court went on to reason that since the plaintiff claimed that the meaning of the arbitra-
tion clause was ambiguous and the plaintiff could possibly claim fraud in the inducement, the
court should discuss the validity of the clause. Id. at 1416.
184. Id.
185. Stiles, 994 F. Supp. at 1416.
186. Id. at 1417. The court also examined whether the arbitration clause was unconscionable.
Id. 1417-18. On this issue, the court held that the plaintiff never showed what was objectionable
about the arbitration, so he did not make a case for unconscionablity. Id. at 1418.
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court held that the arbitration clause was enforceable and the plaintiff
was required to submit to arbitration. 18 7
iii. Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley
In Powertel, Bexley signed a contract with Powertel in order to re-
ceive local telephone service. 8 8 The original contract did not contain
an arbitration clause.' 89 However, the contract included the following
clause:
[Powertel] will provide you [the customer] with at least ten (10)
days' prior notification of any changes or modification to these
Terms and Conditions of Service or of any change to [Powertel's]
rates. By your continued use of the Company's service following
receipt of notice of such changes or modifications, you will be
deemed to have accepted and agreed to them. 19°
Bexley filed a class action lawsuit against Powertel because she was
charged $4.50 in long distance fees for telephone calls that were local
according to her contract.' 91 The day after Bexley filed the complaint,
she received her monthly bill from Powertel in the mail. 192 Along
with the bill, Powertel sent a pamphlet that described terms and con-
ditions of the company's service. 93 This pamphlet included an arbi-
tration clause, which stated:
Any unresolved dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relat-
ing to [Powertel's] service, including but not limited to a claim based
on or arising from an alleged tort, shall be settled by arbitration
administered by the American Arbitration Association under its
Wireless Industry Arbitration Rules, and judgment on the award
rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having
jurisdiction thereof ....
The parties acknowledge that use of [Powertel's] service evidences a
transaction in interstate commerce. The United States Arbitration
Act and federal arbitration law shall govern the interpretation, en-
forcement and proceedings pursuant to this arbitration clause. 194
Powertel filed a motion to stay the litigation and to compel arbitra-
tion in accordance with the arbitration clause. 195 Powertel argued that
even though Bexley received notice of the arbitration clause after she
had filed the lawsuit, the court must compel arbitration because the
187. Id.






194. Powertel, 743 So. 2d at 572.
195. Id. at 573.
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arbitration clause applied to pending lawsuits. 196 The Florida State
Circuit Court for Duval County denied Powertel's motion to compel
arbitration and Powertel subsequently appealed. 97
The court stated that "[a]lthough the states may not impose special
limitations on the use of arbitration clauses, the validity of an arbitra-
tion clause is nevertheless an issue of state contract law .... Thus, an
arbitration clause can be defeated by any defense existing under the
state law of contracts."' 98
In addition, the court held that the arbitration clause was procedur-
ally unconscionable. 99 In support of its holding, the court considered
the following facts: Powertel drafted the agreement; the arbitration
clause was offered on a "take it or leave it" basis; the consumer had
no bargaining power regarding the arbitration clause; and the con-
sumer had no power to reject the clause without canceling the con-
tract and incurring costs with another company. 200 The court also
found that the notice of the clause was deficient because it was hidden
in the pamphlet that was sent with the customers' bills.20'
The court also held that the arbitration clause was substantively un-
conscionable. 20 2 The court determined that the arbitration clause's
limitation on punitive damages only benefited Powertel and not the
consumer. 20 3 The court stated that "as a practical matter, it is difficult
to imagine any situation in which a telephone company would have an
action for punitive damages against its customers. ' 20 4 The court criti-
cized the arbitration clause because it prohibited class action law-
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 574.
199. Powertel, 743 So. 2d at 574. The court described procedural unconscionability as "the
absence of any meaningful choice on the part of the consumer." Id. at 575.
200. Id. at 574-75.
201. Id. at 575. The court quoted the trial court on the issue of notice:
I am real concerned. I don't think there's been the type of notice contemplated here.
I don't think there was ten days prior notification of any change or modification of
certain conditions. The mere filing of this-sending the pamphlet in the mail routinely
with the bill in a very-pamphlet similar to that which you received in the first place, I
don't think this is the type of notice of a change, particularly a change of this nature,
that the company could expect the consumer to know about.
These things are so routine of throwing pamphlets in the mail with billings and things
of that nature that, Lord, I'll bet 90 percent just throw them out and don't even read
them. Because it becomes so routine in today's mailing habits.
But I think something as significant as this should have been brought to the cus-
tomer's attention in some manner ....
Id.
202. Id. at 576.




suits:205 "Again, this is an advantage that inures only to Powertel.
The arbitration clause precludes class litigation by either party, but it
is difficult to envision a scenario in which that would work to
Powertel's detriment. '20 6 The court recognized that the limitation on
damages conflicted with some of the remedies that could be given in
court under state consumer protection law.20 7 Finally, the court held
that if the arbitration clause was valid, it did not apply to the present
dispute because Bexley had already filed the lawsuit before the clause
became applicable. 20 8
b. Cases Addressing Issues of Consent and Notice in the
Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements
i. Lawrence v. Walzer & Gabrielson
On several occasions, lower courts have considered the issues of ad-
equate consent and notice in determining whether to enforce a
mandatory arbitration agreement. In Lawrence v. Walzer & Gabriel-
son,2 0 9 the California Court of Appeals held that an arbitration agree-
ment which included a retainer agreement between an attorney and
client was unenforceable because the client was misled by its scope. 2t0
The arbitration clause stated that "[i]n the event of a dispute between
us regarding fees, costs or any other aspect of our attorney-client rela-
tionship, the dispute shall be resolved by binding arbitration."' 2t I The
court interpreted the language "any other aspect" of the relationship
to refer to the financial matters "regarding fees [and] costs" which is
stated within the same phrase.212 The court rejected the defendant's
argument that "any other aspect" of the relationship included claims
for malpractice. 21 3
205. Id. The court stated:
"[Class litigation provides the most economically feasible remedy for the kind of claim
that has been asserted here. The potential claims are too small to litigate individually,
but collectively they might amount to a large sum of money. The prospect of class
litigation ordinarily has some deterrent effect on a manufacturer or service provider.
but that is absent here."
Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 576-77.
208. Powertel, 743 So. 2d at 577.
209. 256 Cal. Rptr. 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
210. Id. at 9-10. A paralegal who worked for the defendant handed the plaintiff the retainer
agreement and told her to sign it. Id. at 7-8. The plaintiff stated that she "had no idea" that by
signing the agreement, she would give up her right to sue the attorney. Id.
211. Id. at 9 (quoting the retainer agreement between the plaintiff and defendant).
212. Id. at 8-9.
213. Lawrence, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 9. The court interpreted the arbitration clause to only in-
clude financial matters because the arbitration clause "misleadingly appear[ed] to the client to
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In reaching its decision, the court stated, "[a]bsent notification and
at least some explanation, the [client] cannot be said to have exercised
a 'real choice' in selecting arbitration over litigation. '21 4 The court
also recognized that the United States Supreme Court does not sup-
port a waiver of civil jury trial rights where one party "unknowingly
signed a document purporting to exact a waiver. '215 The court consid-
ered the fact that the arbitration agreement was not a product of ne-
gotiation and that the defendant drafted the agreement so as to cause
uncertainty as to its scope. 216
ii. Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix, Ltd. and Sanchez v.
Sirmons
Various lower courts have considered the enforceability of arbitra-
tion clauses in agreements between a doctor and a patient in the medi-
cal malpractice context. 217 In Broemmer v. Abortion Services of
Phoenix, Ltd.,218 the Arizona Supreme Court held that an agreement
to arbitrate was unenforceable when it was included within one of
three forms that a woman was given to sign before undergoing an
abortion. 21 9 The court held that the contract was one of adhesion be-
cause it was offered to the consumer on a "take it or leave it" basis.220
deal almost exclusively with financial matters, while extracting from her a significant yet incon-
spicuous relinquishment of the client's rights regarding future claims of malpractice." Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 10.
216. Id.
217. Courts have addressed the issue of enforceability of mandatory arbitration clauses in
medical malpractice cases. In Sosa v. Paulos, the Supreme Court of Utah held a mandatory
arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable where a patient was given the agreement to
arbitrate all medical malpractice claims "minutes away" from surgery. 924 P.2d 357, 363-64
(Utah 1996). The court took into consideration the facts that the patient did not read the con-
tract because she was nervous and anxious just before surgery; that the contract was an adhesion
contract, since the doctor would not have performed the surgery without the signature and it was
difficult for her to back out of the surgery at that late stage; and that the arbitration agreement
was never explained to the patient by the doctor or a member of his staff. Id. at 363. The case
was remanded to the trial court to decide if a revocation period existed and whether the patient
was aware of an opportunity to revoke the arbitration agreement after the surgery. Id. at 365.
Similarly, in Ob/Gyn Wixted v. Pepper, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that a mandatory
arbitration agreement was unenforceable when it was included in a form given to a patient at a
clinic to sign before receiving treatment. 693 P.2d 1259, 1260-61 (Nev. 1985). The court consid-
ered the facts that the agreement was never explained to the patient and that the patient could
not remember agreeing to the term. Id. at 1261.
218. 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992).
219. Id. at 1014-15.
220. Id. at 1016 (stating the characteristics of adhesion which were present in the contract,
including: (1) the fact that the drafter included a term that was advantageous to itself requiring
the arbitrator to be a licensed medical doctor; (2) the contract was not negotiated; (3) the con-
tract terms were offered as a condition of treatment; (4) the defendant never explained the terms
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The court stated that an adhesion contract was unenforceable if the
standard non-negotiated terms "[did] not fall within the reasonable
expectations of the weaker or 'adhering' party. '221 In reaching its de-
cision that the plaintiff did not reasonably expect to waive her right to
a jury trial by signing the form, the court took into consideration the
fact that no one from the clinic explained the arbitration agreement to
the plaintiff, she had only a high school education, was inexperienced
in commercial matters, and was not sure "what arbitration [wa]s. ' 222
Similarly, in Sanchez v. Sirmons,223 the Supreme Court of New
York held that an arbitration agreement was not enforceable where a
patient did not knowingly consent to the agreement. 224 The arbitra-
tion agreement was included on a form entitled "Consent to Abor-
tion" which was given to the patient by the receptionist to sign.225 The
court held that for a waiver of the constitutional right to a jury trial to
be valid, the waiver must be given knowingly, voluntarily, and intelli-
gently.226 The court found that the defendant had not satisfied these
requirements because the arbitration clause was "concealed ... in a
form," the clause was not brought to the plaintiff's attention, and its
meaning and effect were not explained to the plaintiff.
227
III. ANALYSIS
Courts often resolve the issue of enforceability of arbitration
clauses in adhesion contracts in favor of the corporation. An alarming
instance of judicial enforceability exists when consumers do not have
adequate notice of the arbitration clause which is of particular impor-
tance to consumer law. Therefore, the presence of the arbitration
clauses in contracts, limiting consumers' ability to sue corporations in
the judicial system, can lead to an abuse of customers and threats to
consumer protection laws.
to the plaintiff; and (5) the defendant never told the plaintiff that she could refuse to sign the
agreement).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1017.
223. 467 N.Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
224. Id. at 757.
225. Id. at 758. The plaintiff claimed that she thought that by signing the form she was only
consenting to submitting to the abortion. Id. at 759. The defendant admitted that neither he,
nor anyone else in his office, explained to the plaintiff that she would waive her rights to a trial
by jury by signing the "Consent to Abortion" form. Id.
226. Id. at 760.
227. Sanchez, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 760. The court also briefly discussed its reservations about
enforcing any "arbitration clause in a contract between physician and patient" which are signed




A. The FAA is Used by Corporations to Abuse Consumers
Congress created the FAA to promote extra-judicial resolution of
disputes for various public policy reasons, including the reduction in
the cost of dispute resolution and the encouragement of adverse par-
ties to salvage their relationships. 228 The FAA supports the enforce-
ment of mandatory arbitration clauses as valid waivers of the rights to
access the judicial system, including the right to have a jury trial.229
The FAA's mandated preference for out of court dispute resolution
and enforcement of contractual arbitration clauses is reasonable when
all of the parties of a contract have negotiated for the mandatory arbi-
tration clause and have knowingly consented to the clause.230 How-
ever, problems may arise when the parties do not have equal
bargaining power or when one party has not knowingly consented to
waive his rights to access the judicial system under the Seventh and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.23 1
Since Congress passed the FAA in 1925, the disparity in power be-
tween consumers and large corporations has widened. A consumer's
lack of power leaves him virtually defenseless in disputes with large
corporations. This situation is only exacerbated when the consumer's
recourse in the courts is eliminated. Congress has recognized consum-
ers' relative lack of power and has created many statutes to protect
consumer rights. 232 However, in order to use the statutes to enforce
228. See S. REt'. No. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (avoiding "the delay and expense of litigation"); H.R.
RE'. No. 97-542, at 13 (1982) ("The advantages of arbitration are . . . [that] it is cheaper and
faster than litigation ... [and] it normally minimizes hostility and is less disruptive of ongoing
and future business dealings among the parties."). See also supra notes 32-44 and accompanying
text (explaining the background of the FAA and the purpose behind its enactment).
229. See 9 U.S.C § 4 (1933) (directing courts to compel arbitration in accordance with the
terms of valid arbitration agreements). See also supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
230. According to one advocate of arbitration, parties choose arbitration because litigation:
(1) is a burdensome process; (2) involves complex rules of evidence; (3) requires principles of
substantive law to apply; (4) allows the loser to appeal. See Davis, supra note 7, at 54-55. The
post-trial judicial process is deemed just as burdensome by arbitration advocates and described
as
an arduous climb up the appellate ladder. The appellate court will reverse the trial
court's decision if the judge made a mistake or fact or law that may have affected the
outcome of the case. Once this process is completed, the losing party may be entitled
to. and in any event may seek, yet another appeal. The daunting consequence of a
triumphant appeal may be a new trial.
Id. at 55.
231. See supra notes 125-227 and accompanying text (describing various cases where a weaker
party claims to have not knowingly waived rights to access the judicial system).
232. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1968) (forcing companies to
disclose all terms of consumer loans at the initiation of the loan contract.); Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (1977) (preventing debt collectors from lying to consumers or
tricking consumers into paying debt); Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312
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their rights, consumers must turn to the judicial system to force large
corporations to comply with the statutes.233 Nonetheless, large corpo-
rations have begun to use the FAA as a shield against the only
weapon given to consumers, the judicial system. Thus, mandatory ar-
bitration clauses create a circular problem for consumers who cannot
access the judicial system to enforce their statutory rights that Con-
gress specifically created to protect consumers from corporations.
On several occasions, the Supreme Court has enforced arbitration
agreements under mandatory arbitration clauses between two parties
and has used the FAA as support for its decision.234 In Allied-Bruce,
the Court held that the FAA should be interpreted broadly in order to
apply it to any contract involving interstate commerce, regardless of
the contracting parties' contemplations.2 35 Similarly, in Doctor's As-
sociates, the Court held that a state cannot mandate consumer protec-
tion through statutory notice requirements of arbitration clauses
because the FAA precludes state law that prohibits the enforcement
of arbitration clauses.2 36 In both of these decisions, the Supreme
Court expressly supported a policy of using the FAA to enforce arbi-
tration clauses; 237 therefore, decisions such as Allied-Bruce and Doc-
tor's Associates opened the floodgates and gave large corporations the
ability to use arbitration clauses to protect themselves from consumer
litigation under the FAA.
Large corporations began to include mandatory arbitration clauses
in their contracts with consumers. 238 As a result, by signing contracts
in everyday transactions, many consumers have unknowingly waived
their rights to use the judicial system to resolve disputes with corpora-
tions.239 This lack of knowledge or consent causes grand concern
when consumers initiate legal action against corporations and subse-
quently are informed that they previously waived their right to the
judicial system when they signed the contract.2 40 With the FAA and
the Supreme Court supporting the enforcement of arbitration clauses,
(1975) (forcing companies to comply with implicit and explicit warranties of their products and
services).
233. See infra note 232 (citing examples of federal statutes which provide for causes of actions
against companies that violate the Acts).
234. See supra notes 62-70, 93-124, 131-158 and accompanying text.
235. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 278 (1995). See supra notes 110-118
and accompanying text.
236. Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto. 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). See supra notes 117-124
and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 110-124 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 12 (quoting an example of an arbitration clause).
239. See supra notes 125-227 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 131-227 and accompanying text.
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corporations are able to effectively "trick" consumers into waiving
their rights by signing contracts which have arbitration clauses buried
within the text of the contract.
B. Mandatory Arbitration Threatens Common Law
Consumer Protection
Mandatory arbitration effectively strips consumers of their rights to
protect themselves from large corporations and jeopardizes the Amer-
ican judicial process of developing common law.2 41 Every citizen has
the right to dispute any contract which violates public policy, however,
arbitration clauses provide a road for large corporations to circumvent
this right and effectively take it away from consumers.
Furthermore, in contrast to courts of law, arbitration does not have
to follow common law, 2 4 2 and at times arbitration does not have to
follow statutory law that exists to protect consumers. 243 For example,
in Gilmer, the central issue was whether mandatory arbitration stifles
the development of law by not allowing a written opinion.2 44 The
Court decided that the issue was moot as applied to the specific facts
because the arbitration forum mandated by the contract required a
written opinion by the arbitrator. 245 Unfortunately, many arbitration
forums and contracts do not require written opinions and even go as
far as requiring confidentiality of the arbitration altogether.246 Conse-
241. See Davis, supra note 7, at 84. "Judges issue written opinions shaping the law and lend-
ing predictability to it. People who understand the law can avert disputes. Since arbitrators
often do not write opinions and since their decisions have no precedential effect, arbitration
undermines the predictability of the law." Id.
242. Chief Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit for the United States Court of Ap-
peals conceded:
IJiudges follow the law ... [because] if they do not their decisions are corrected on
appeal, while arbitrators, who often . . . are not lawyers and cannot be compelled to
follow the law and their errors cannot be corrected on appeal, although there are some
limitations on the power of arbitrators to flout the law.
IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 136 F.3d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 1998) (citations
omitted).
243. The courts can use a subjective test of whether the arbitrator knowingly failed to apply
the law in giving the award. DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 821 (2d Cir.
1997). If the arbitrator applied bad law, but not on purpose, the award may be upheld by the
courts. Id. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
244. Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991). See supra notes 93-109
and accompanying text.
245. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
246. For example, the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) requires confidentiality of awards
as follows: "Arbitration proceedings are confidential, unless the Parties agree otherwise. A
Party who improperly discloses confidential information shall be subject to sanctions. The Arbi-
trator, Director, and Forum shall not disclose confidential information." NATIONAL ARBITRA-
TION FORUM, CODE OF PROCEDURE, Rule 4 (Sept. 1, 1999).
1222 [Vol. 50:1191
MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES
quently, each time a dispute is arbitrated privately, the decision does
not act as precedent for future decisions.247 Thus, out of court dispute
arbitration is attractive to large corporations because, without prece-
dent, it can continue engaging in harmful or unlawful practices with-
out fearing lawsuits or bad publicity.248  This prevention of lawsuits
may take weight off of the judicial system, but only at the expense of
the consumer. 249
C. Stuffers as a "Waiver" of the Right to Sue
Stuffers are notices of change in the terms of a contract between a
company and a consumer that are sent after the execution of the origi-
nal contract.250 Companies argue that stuffers are legally valid notices
of changes in contracts. 251 On the other hand, consumer advocates
contend that stuffers do not provide adequate notice to the consumer
that the fundamental right to a trial or trial by jury is being waived by
the consumer when doing business with a particular company. 252 Un-
fortunately, courts are split on this issue of whether stuffers provide
adequate notice to the consumer.
247. "[A]rbitrators' decisions are not intended to have precedential effect even in arbitration
. . . let alone in the courts." IDS Life Insurance Company, 136 F.3d at 543. Arbitrators' deci-
sions "are more like jury verdicts than like the decisions of courts, and jury verdicts are not given
any weight as precedents." Id. Arbitration is a more favorable alternative to court litigation for
large companies, because the decisions are private and the risk of publicity tarnishing the com-
pany's reputation or encouraging other consumers to sue the company is eliminated by arbitra-
tion. Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial Institutions: A
Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO Sr. J. ON Disp. RESL. 267, 271 (1995).
248. See, e.g., McMillen, supra note 21, at 35 (arguing that only a jury trial can deter a large
corporation from harmful practices, listing examples of such harmful products removed from the
market by a jury). See also supra note 21 and accompanying text (citing the example of the Pinto
car that exploded).
249. Proponents of arbitration hail clauses that compel consumers to arbitrate claims they
otherwise would have litigated. See Anne Brafford, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts
of Adhesion: Fair Play or Trap for the Weak and Unwary?, 21 IOWA J. CORP. L. 331, 360 (1996)
(explaining that arbitration programs that have a high volume of participants are those that tend
to be compulsory, while voluntary programs are underutilized).
250. See supra notes 162-208 and accompanying text.
251. See Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 277 (1998) (describing Bank of
America's argument that it legitimately relied on a change-in-terms clause in an attempt to en-
force a mandatory arbitration agreement printed on a stuffer); Stiles v. Home Cable Concepts,
Inc., 994 F. Supp 1410, 1413 (1998) (enforcing an arbitration clause that was sent to a consumer
four years after the date of the original contract pursuant to a change-in-terms agreement);
Powertel. Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 575-76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (describing Powertel's
argument that an arbitration clause sent to the customer with her bill was valid because the
original contract allowed the company to make changes to the agreement with ten days' notice).
252. Some advocates of arbitration clauses do not find the issue of notice to be persuasive
because they believe that consumer intent or consent should not be a concern of the courts.
Brafford, supra note 254, at 352-53. They argue that in a complex society, we must rely on
standardized contracts and courts should not rely on the subjective intent to contract. Id.
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For example, in Badie, the California Court of Appeal held that
consent of the consumer to the arbitration clause on a stuffer was
lacking. 253 The court reasoned that the consumer agreed to the
change-in-terms clause in the original contract, but that the change-in-
terms clause is limited to the terms in the original contract and not
new terms added to the contract.2 54 In contrast, a few months before
Badie was decided, the United States District Court in Alabama in
Stiles, decided that an arbitration clause added to a contract pursuant
to a change-in-terms agreement was enforceable.2 55 In Stiles, the
court held that the arbitration clause was enforceable because the
consumer assented to the contract as a whole, including the change-in-
terms agreement and any changes made pursuant to that
agreement. 256
Although the outcomes are different, the facts in these two cases
are very similar. In both cases the purpose of the original contract
was to issue credit to the consumer, the contracts contained a change-
253. Badie, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289-90. See supra notes 162-176 and accompanying text.
254. Badie, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 285. See supra notes 162-176 and accompanying text.
One credit card company devised a method to avoid the limits of a change-in-terms agreement
to terms that exist in the original contract. MBNA America Bank, N.A. recently sent out an
"IMPORTANT NOTICE OF CHANGE-IN-TERMS" to its customers which effectively
changes the terms of the "change-in-terms" clause. It reads:
Effective February 11, 2000, the following amendment will apply to your existing
credit card agreement. This amendment will apply to the entire unpaid balance, includ-
ing the balance existing before this amendment becomes effective. This amendment
shall replace all provisions concerning changing the terms of your existing credit card
agreement and the state law(s) that govern your existing credit card agreement. This
amendment also changes the way in which Crestar may have amended or modified the
terms of your account in the past. Any inconsistencies between this amendment and
your existing credit card agreement shall be governed by this amendment. Please read
this notice and keep it with your agreement.
Amendment: We may anend your agreement by adding, deleting, or changing provi-
sions in compliance with the applicable notification requirements of federal law and the
laws of the State of Delaware. If an amendment gives you the opportunity to reject the
change, and if you reject the change in the manner provided in such amendment, we
may terminate your right to receive credit on this account and may ask you to return all
credit devices as a condition of your rejection. The amended agreement (including any
higher rate or other higher charges or fees) will apply to the entire unpaid balance,
including the balance existing before the amendment became effective. We may re-
place your credit card with another credit card at any time.
Individualized BankCard Services, "Important Notice of Change-In-Terms," © 2000 MBNA
America Bank, N.A. (explaining the new changes in terms for credit card accounts that Crestar
transferred to MBNA on a letter sent out to customers January, 2000) (emphasis added). This
amendment changes the "change-in-terms" procedures to allow the credit card company to actu-
ally add new terms to the agreement in the future, such as an arbitration clause, even if that type
of term does not currently exist. See id.
255. See Stiles v. Home Cable Concepts, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1410 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
256. Id. at 1416.
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in-terms clause, the defendants used the mail to send the consumer a
mandatory arbitration clause on a stuffer, and the plaintiffs claimed
that they were not aware that they waived their right to use the judi-
cial system. 257 Even though the facts are similar in Badie and Stiles,
the holdings are at odds with each other.
The Stiles decision clearly protects the interests of the company by
allowing a consumer to unknowingly waive a potentially unlimited
number of rights by merely signing a contract that included a change-
in-terms agreement. The court in Stiles was not concerned about
whether the consumer consented to the waiver of the right to trial or
whether the consumer had any notice or knowledge of the waiver.258
Thus, under the Stiles ruling, a company can avoid consumer lawsuits
by using trickery. Further, the Stiles decision provides an incentive for
companies to bury change-in-terms agreement within the fine print of
the contract, and subsequently send the consumer "notice" in similar
print describing how all disputes must be solved by arbitration.2 59
Under Stiles, this type of "notice" is sufficient to enforce the arbitra-
tion clause, regardless of whether the consumer ever read the con-
tract. The Stiles decision is completely supported by the preference
for arbitration and enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses
mandated by the FAA.
On the other hand, the Badie decision clearly protects the interest
of consumers by recognizing the absurdity of the argument that a con-
sumer can waive a fundamental right simply by receiving a piece of
paper in the mail.260 The Badie court avoided the FAA roadblock by
adopting a literal interpretation of "change-in-terms" 261 and disal-
lowed the destruction of consumer rights through the change-in-terms
clause by prohibiting the company from actually adding terms to the
contract without negotiation, consent, or knowledge of the
consumer.
262
Similarly, in Powertel, the court recognized that there was a defi-
ciency in notice to the consumer when the arbitration clause was sent
257. See supra notes 162-159 and accompanying text.
258. Stiles, 994 F. Supp at 1417 (dismissing the plaintiff's argument that the arbitration clause
was invalid because he did not understand it by referring to basic contract law that a contract
cannot be invalidated by a unilateral mistake of one party).
259. See infra note 325 (describing the Powertel court's opinion that most consumers probably
throw stuffers away without reading them).
260. See supra notes 162-176 and accompanying text (explaining the limit placed on a change-
in-terms clause by the court in Badie to change terms only which existed in the original contract
and not add new terms not included in the original contract).
261. See supra notes 162-176 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 188-208 and accompanying text.
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in a pamphlet stuffed in the envelope with her monthly bill.263 The
court stated that the method used by Powertel to amend the original
contract to include an arbitration clause "may have left many custom-
ers unaware of the new arbitration clause. '264
D. Persuasive Factors Considered by Courts in Deciding Whether
Adequate Notice and Consent Exist
Courts have found that adequate notice and consent to arbitration
clauses is essential to the enforceability of the clause. 265 The issue of
whether arbitration clauses are drafted in a way that consumers
should have known that a dispute would fall within the scope of the
arbitration clause has been considered by courts.266 For example, in
Lawrence, the California Court of Appeals examined the scope of the
arbitration clause and considered the fact that in the attorney-client
relationship the attorney had the power to draft the agreement, while
the client had the written agreement from which to interpret the scope
of the agreement to arbitrate. 267 Since the attorney was the more
powerful party and caused the uncertainty as to the scope of the
agreement, the court decided to construe the interpretation of the
agreement against the attorney and side in favor of the client's inter-
pretation of the agreement. 268
A similar disparity in power between two contracting parties can
also be found in consumer contracts. In consumer contracts, one
party in the transaction is always a company or organization who is
likely to be financially powerful. 269 The other party may be an indi-
263. Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 575 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
264. See supra notes 162-176, 209-227 and accompanying text.
265. See Lawrence v. Walzer & Gabrielson, 256 Cal. Rptr. 6, 8-9 (1989). The court held that
when specific examples are listed followed by "or any other" dispute language, the "or any
other" language should be limited to disputes related to the examples provided. Id. at 9. The
arbitration clause was construed against the drafter and the court questioned whether the plain-
tiff actually had knowledge of the arbitration clause or a choice in agreeing to it. Id. at 10.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 9-10.
268. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 380 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See supra
notes 163-209, 217-227 and accompanying text.
269. See Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital. 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (stating
that "[a]bsent notification and at least some explanation, the patient cannot be said to have
exercised a 'real choice' in selecting arbitration over litigation"); Ramirez v. Superior Court, 163
Cal. Rptr. 223, 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that the Supreme Court has "in no way sug-
gested that jury trial rights could be ... taken away from one who unknowingly signed a docu-
ment purporting to exact a waiver"); Lawrence, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 9-10 (holding that a client must
be fully advised by his attorney of the consequences of an arbitration agreement between them);
Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Ariz. 1992) (stating "[i]t
would be unreasonable to enforce such a critical term [an arbitration clause] against a plaintiff
when it is not a negotiated term and defendant failed to explain it to [plaintiff] or call her atten-
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vidual consumer who may be uneducated, inexperienced in business,
elderly, unable to read fine print due to deteriorating vision or illiter-
acy, or indigent and very desperate for money or consumer credit.
When sending consumers credit offers or stuffer arbitration agree-
ments, companies do not take into account the special needs of the
individual consumers thus, making the consumers less powerful.
In addition, consumers are not involved in the drafting process of
the arbitration clause and usually do not have an attorney at their
disposal to interpret the scope of the agreement every time their
credit card company sends them mail. Companies have the legal ad-
vantage of having attorneys draft arbitration clauses, hence the
clauses are difficult for consumers to interpret without legal
assistance.
Courts have also found that if the arbitration clause was not ex-
plained to the consumer, it may be held unenforceable. 270 In Law-
rence, Wheeler, Ramirez, Broemmer, and Sanchez, the courts found
that in determining whether an arbitration clause was enforceable, the
pivotal factors were whether the arbitration clause was brought to the
plaintiff's attention and whether it was explained to the plaintiff.27 1 In
most circumstances, large companies send contracts to consumers
through the mail and the terms of the agreements, including arbitra-
tion clauses, are not explained to the consumers. 272 Further, it is
likely that consumers do not notice that an arbitration clause is in-
cluded in the contract.27 3 Just as courts have decided that in the con-
tion to it"); Sanchez v. Sirmons, 467 N.Y.S.2d 757, 760 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (stating "the arbitra-
tion provision should have been called to the petitioner's attention and she should have been
given a reasonable explanation of its meaning and effect"). See also supra notes 116-125, 127-
136 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 209-227 and accompanying text.
271. See infra note 325 (describing the Powertel court's opinion that many consumers throw
stuffers away without reading them).
272. See supra notes 209-227 and accompanying text (explaining various instances where
courts considered lack of explanation of an adhesion contract that is handed to a person for
signature to be influential in determining whether that person even noticed or understood partic-
ular terms in the contract).
273. See Broemmer, 840 P.2d at 1015-16; Sanchez, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 760. An argument against
courts' reliance on an adhesion doctrine is that adhesion alone is not a reason to invalidate a
contract. While adhesion may be considered in determining whether the contract is unconscion-
able, the true issue is whether a contract is truly unconscionable, not whether it is adhesive. See
Brafford, supra note 254, at 348-49. This argument is extended further to place the blame of
consumer abuse by large corporations on the consumers themselves because they voluntarily
assumed the risk of the adhesion contract by entering it, and "[jiudicial intervention into an
adhesive contract would recast [those] risks . I..." d. This argument is only too persuasive to
someone who does not believe that disparity in power between contracting parties should be
considered in enforcing contracts. Many courts, however, do find disparity in power influential
in determining whether a contract should be enforced. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furni-
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text of attorney-client and doctor-patient relationships an explanation
of the arbitration clause is necessary for it to be enforceable, courts
should also begin to require an explanation to the consumer in the
corporation-consumer relationship.
Another factor that has been influential in courts' decisions to in-
validate arbitration clauses is whether the clause was included in an
adhesion contract.2 74 In Broemmer, the Arizona Supreme Court ap-
plied the standard of whether the non-negotiated terms "f[ell] within
the reasonable expectations of the weaker or 'adhering' party. 2 75 In
consumer contracts, especially those sent through the mail, a con-
sumer cannot reasonably expect to waive his or her fundamental
rights to use the judicial system or a jury trial just by agreeing to do
business with a company. Most consumers do not have the expertise
to evaluate the legal ramifications of all of the clauses in fine print in
the agreement.
For instance, credit agreements and similar consumer contracts are
always considered adhesion contracts.2 76  Unless credit agreements
conspicuously, and in plain language, spell out the arbitration clause,
inform consumers of their rights and which of those rights the con-
sumer is forfeiting, the arbitration clause cannot be said to fall within
the consumer's reasonable expectations. In reality, it is not until a
consumer has a dispute with a company, that he will seek legal advice.
It is usually only after the consumer has consulted an attorney and
after a dispute has arisen, that the consumer is informed that the arbi-
ture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (considering the fact that "when a party of little
bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract with
little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective mani-
festation of his consent, was ever given to all the terms").
274. Broemmer. 840 P.2d at 1016.
275. Assuming that an adhesion contract is a form contract that is offered on a "take-it-or-
leave-it" basis, it would be logistically and economically impossible for large banks and credit
card companies to extend credit to thousands of individual customers without using an adhesion
contract. Advocates of arbitration clauses argue that consumers are benefited by the efficiency
of standardized contracts, even when they did not subjectively consent to waive their rights to
sue the company. See Brafford, supra note 254, at 351 (arguing that without standardized con-
tracts. "'individual negotiations would take time, the transaction costs would increase, and the
business would pass those costs on to the consumer," and "[bly arbitrating disputes, the business
saves litigation costs and can pass those savings on to the consumer").
276. See Stiles v. Home Cable Concepts, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1410, 1414 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (ex-
plaining that the customer was not aware of the rights he gave up in signing an arbitration clause
until the attorney he hired to sue the company explained those rights to him); Lawrence v.
Walzer & Gabrielson, 256 Cal. Rptr. 6, 9-10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing that a client did
not understand she waived her right to sue her attorney for malpractice by signing a retainer that
included an ambiguous arbitration agreement).
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tration clause was in the contract. 277 Thus, it can be implied that a
consumer who seeks legal advice does not evidence one who "reason-
ably" expected to waive his fundamental right to sue.
E. Arbitration Strips Consumers of Procedural Protections
Guaranteed in Court
Arbitration includes many unfair advantages for powerful parties
because it eliminates many complicated procedures inherent in the ju-
dicial system which were created to ensure a fair trial for less powerful
parties. 278 One unfair advantage is that arbitration clauses often spe-
cifically prohibit class action litigation.279 This presents a problem
when many consumers have entered into identical adhesion contracts
including arbitration clauses, and are ultimately harmed by the com-
pany.280 These consumers may be banned from joining together to
resolve their dispute as a group. 2 11 Class action litigation was created
to help weak parties combine their efforts and resources to fight pow-
erful parties, yet companies are able to avoid class actions and retain
their excessive power by including arbitration clauses in their adhe-
sion contracts. Additionally, the lack of the risk of a class action liti-
gation, or binding precedent, 28 2 acts as a disincentive for large
corporations to change their practices after consumers have been
damaged. 28 3
In addition, arbitration lacks safeguards inherent to the judicial sys-
tem, such as discovery, which is designed to maximize the fairness of
trial.284 Many arbitrators discourage and severely limit the discovery
277. See HOENIGER, supra note 19, § 1.06 at 1-8 (listing three reasons for not arbitrating:
"there is no discovery in arbitration, arbitrators tend to 'split the baby,' and there is no appeal").
278. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. See also Paul Bland, Resisting Corporate Ef-
forts to Impose Mandatory Arbitration on Consumers, 2 TEX. J. OF CONSUMER L. 94, 96 (1999)
(stating that "no matter how small the dollar value of a plaintiff's claim or how unlikely it is that
a plaintiff would be able to pursue the claim on a class-wide basis, mandatory arbitration gener-
ally does away with class actions").
279. See Powertel Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that ban-
ning litigation as a class action reduces the consumers' ability to seek relief when they, otherwise,
'might join together to seek relief that would be impractical for any of them to obtain alone").
280. id. (noticing that the language of the arbitration clause effectively removed the defen-
dant's exposure to remedy on behalf of a class).
281. See supra note 244-247.
282. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
283. See infra notes 285-284.
284. With no clear guidelines to follow in ordering discovery, each arbitrator can make up his
own "rules" about the discovery process. For example,
[n]othing in the AAA Commercial Rules deals directly with discovery .... There is no
suggestion in the AAA Commercial Rules that a prehearing deposition may be ordered
by the arbitrators. Some AAA arbitrators might thus be loath to order such deposi-
20011 1.229
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1191
process.285 Such a practice disadvantages consumers since the large
companies usually hold all of the necessary and relevant documenta-
tion of the dispute.286 In addition arbitration lacks the safeguards pro-
vided by the rules of evidence.287 Large corporations are often
unfairly advantaged because the arbitrator is able to choose the evi-
dence that is allowed in resolving the dispute, and the large corpora-
tions' attorneys are experts in the arbitration format. On the other
hand, the consumers' attorneys are often inexperienced with the for-
mat in any given arbitration setting.288
Finally, mandatory arbitration denies consumers the traditional ele-
ments of the judicial system, including written opinions,289 the benefit
of electing and appointing public officials as judges over the proceed-
ing,29i the option of having a jury as the decision maker, and a fair
appellate process to guarantee justice. Arbitrators usually do not pro-
duce a written opinion explaining to parties the reasons for their deci-
sions; 2 9 1 hence, there is no check on the process to determine whether
the decision was fair.292 It would be easy for defense attorneys to
form relationships with arbitrators with whom they often work in
lions, even if the need is compelling because such procedure is outside the norm of
AAA practice.
See HOENIGER, supra note 19, § 6.11 at 6-34-35: Budnitz, supra note 247, at 283 (stating that the
extent of discovery allowed in arbitration is "a far cry ... from a party having at its disposal the
wide array of discovery techniques such as interrogatories, motions to produce documents, depo-
sitions, etc."). See also Michael F. Hoellering & Peter Goetz, Piercing the Veil: Document Discov-
ery in Arbitration Hearings, 47 ARB. J. 59 (Sept. 1992).
285. The defendant large corporation often has the only existing records of product informa-
tion, records of complaints about products or services of the company, profits the company
makes while violating consumer rights, and prior lawsuits or arbitration on the same issue by the
company. See Budnitz, supra note 247, at 283-84.
286. See Davis v. Prudential Securities, 59 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11 th Cir. 1995) (stating that arbi-
trators are not bound by judicial rules of evidence). See also Bland, supra note 279, at 95 (stating
that "[a]rbitrators need not follow rules of evidence and may consider hearsay evidence").
287. "[M]any practicing attorneys, including many with substantial litigation experience, still
know nothing about arbitration .... See Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 452.
288. See supra note 246-247 and accompanying text.
289. By agreeing to arbitrate, parties waive their rights to a hearing presided over by an
elected judge or a judge appointed by a public official. See Budnitz, supra note 247, at 283.
290. See supra note 246-248 and accompanying text.
291. "Courts typically will not pry into the factual or legal conclusions of arbitrators. Even
when undertaken, judicial review is difficult because arbitrators' decisions seldom contain any
supporting rationale .... See Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 439.
292. An analogy can be drawn on this point between out of court arbitration in civil cases and
plea bargaining in criminal cases. Both are instances where parties become accustomed to set-
tling cases that would otherwise be tried. Just as defense attorneys in civil cases may become
experts at using arbitration to gain favorable results, criminal defense attorneys become experts
at plea bargaining and prefer to resolve criminal cases without ever going to trial. See MILTON
HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 84-91 (1978). Heumann described the process that a criminal
defense attorney goes through in adjusting to plea bargaining as follows:
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resolving disputes, as well as to learn a developed pattern in which the
arbitrator rules.293 Large corporations give arbitration organizations a
lot of business which may implicitly pressure arbitrators to rule on the
side of large corporations, due to the ever present threat that unsatis-
fied corporations could take their business to another arbitrator. 294 It
is important to have some type of protection for the consumer to
guarantee that the arbitration organization is not influenced by
outside pressures to keep the business of large corporations, and one
of the primary ways to ensure the fairness of the dispute resolution is
to look at the arbitrator's reasons for arriving at a particular resolu-
tion. 295 However, without written opinions, this protective and evalu-
ative tool does not exist.296
He acts hesitantly at first and with greater confidence in succeeding cases. What is
happening-almost unknown to him-is that he is sharpening his own plea bargaining
negotiations, becoming more confident that his strategy and tactics in these negotia-
tions, his informal adversary approach, if you will, is leading to excellent deals for his
clients.
Id. at 90. Similarly, civil defense attorneys develop strategies and tactics in arbitration that lead
to "excellent deals" for their clients. Plaintiffs' attorneys may have less experience with arbitra-
tion and, consequently, less successful strategies and tactics.
293. Richard C. Reuben, The Dark Side ofADR, 14 CAL. LAw. 53, 54 (1994) (stating that for-
profit ADR providers have conflicts in interest between providing neutral arbitration and retain-
ing repeat business from large companies): see Budnitz, supra note 247, at 321-22 (stating '[a]
,repeat player' such as a lender which determines the arbitration organization and uses arbitra-
tion frequently ... has a decided advantage over the 'one shot' player such as the consumer").
294. The National Arbitration Forum, one of the country's largest arbitration organizations,
specifically provides in its code of procedure that arbitrators are not to "include any reasons,
findings of fact or conclusions of law" unless both parties request an opinion in writing before
the proceeding. NATIONAL ARBITRATrION FORUM, COOE OF PROCEDURE, Part VI, Rule 37(G)
(1991). The American Arbitration Association also encourages "arbitrators to limit their award
to a statement of relief given and to avoid a lengthy explanation." See Stipanowich, supra note
7, at 439.
295. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) (recognizing that the FAA does not require
written opinions); O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Professional Planning Assocs., 857 F.2d 742, 747 (lth Cir.
1988) (holding that the "manifest disregard" standard to prove that the arbitrator did not follow
the law in the decision requires proof in the record that the arbitrator knowingly disregarded the
law). Without any written record or opinion, an arbitrator has the opportunity to base decisions
on outside influences and disregard the law, without the fear of judicial review.
Advocates for arbitration view the lack of a written opinion as a benefit that makes arbitration
a more efficient process than litigation. See Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 439-40. These advo-
cates may argue that "limitations on review are consistent with the notion that, for better or
worse, the parties have bargained for arbitral justice without judicial intervention. They serve to
put an effective end to dispute resolution, preventing a case from dragging on for months or
years in the appeal stage." Id. at 440. See also HOENIGER, supra note 19, A3-25 (stating that
certain "organizations and practitioners favor 'bare' awards without explanation of any sort, in
the belief that such awards are the least likely to be challenged and overturned by a court").
296. In federal courts, a party may petition the court for a new judge, if the party believes that
the assigned judge has a personal bias or prejudice towards one party to the proceeding, and
another judge will be assigned to the case. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1998).
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Additional benefits offered by the American judicial system, but
lacking in arbitration, are the process of choosing judges297 and the
option of having a jury as the decision maker. 298 Whether a judge is
elected or appointed, all consumers have the opportunity through the
power of voting to influence the choice of judges. Judges who are
elected have to answer to the public when they rule against public
policy in consumer law cases and the citizens have the right and the
power to vote the judge out of office.299 For judges who are appointed
by other public officials, the voting power of the public can act as an
influence because the citizens are able to inform their elected repre-
sentatives about their dissatisfaction with an appointed member of the
judiciary.
On the contrary, arbitrators are neither elected nor appointed by
public officials, and are often chosen by the large corporations. 300
Even when the arbitrators are chosen at random, the consumer runs
297. The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "[I]n Suits at com-
mon law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of common law." U.S. CONsi., amend. VII.
298. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also preserve the right to a jury trial: "The right of
trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute
of the United States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate." FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a). The
Rules also state that "[a]ny party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a
jury." FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b).
Furthermore, a party has the right to select the jury after examining prospective jurors. FED.
R. Civ. P. 47(a). A party may ask the court to excuse prospective jurors for good cause, if the
party feels the jurors cannot be fair. FED. R. Civ. P. 47(c). If a juror is not excused for cause,
each party to a civil action is entitled to strike at least three prospective jurors from the panel.
28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1948); FED. R. Civ. P. 47(b).
However, the political process of electing judges has been criticized. Former chief judge Abner
Mikva explained that:
Citizens do have access to the political process through contact with their elected offi-
cials . . . . But the judiciary is supposed to operate in a different manner, without
outside influence and under accepted guidelines. Judges shouldn't be glad-handing at
ward meetings, and making themselves "accessible." People who sit on the bench are
supposed to be above the fray, so they can decide cases based on the law, not on the
whims of politics, polls, or personal relationships.
Abner Mikva, Judges Should be Selected, Not Elected, distributed at Discussion by the A.B.A.
Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, DePaul University College of Law (Aug. 31,
1999) (on file with the author).
299. Arbitration clauses often name the organization that will conduct the arbitration; there-
fore, the company as drafter of the adhesion contract chooses the arbitrator. Paul Bland, a
consumer advocate, recognized that "[i]f an arbitrator rules against a corporate client too often,
the company can easily take its business to another arbitrator." See Bland, supra note 279, at 95.
300. Many problems arise when the arbitrator lacks the requisite knowledge and experience
in dispute resolution, including the arbitrator's inability to narrow issues of dispute, allowing the
introduction of irrelevant evidence, and reaching a poor decision that is not based on the funda-
mental issues. See Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 449-50. "It is often charged that an arbitrator's
ignorance or inexperience leads to unjustifiable compromise in the award." Id. at 450.
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the risk of being subjected to the decisions of an unfair arbitrator with
no recourse to prevent the arbitrator from presiding over future dis-
putes.30' Unlike the judicial system, arbitration provides no method
of weeding out bad arbitrators for consumers. 30 2 The arbitrator does
not only take the place of the judge in presiding over the process, but
is also the substitute for the jury as the neutral decision maker. There-
fore, the risk of bias is lower with a jury as the decision maker than
with an arbitrator because a jury is comprised of several individuals
and the prejudices of any one individual are not likely to be reflected
in the decision of the entire group.30 3
Moreover, the appellate process for arbitrated disputes is severely
restricted. Without the same discovery process that is allowed to citi-
zens who resolve their disputes in court, the appellate court is limited
in the factual finding on which it can base its decision. 30 4 Without all
of the facts that would otherwise be available to a consumer, an ap-
peal of an arbitrated dispute will unfairly disadvantage the consumer
who may lose the appeal, simply because the large corporation was
allowed by the arbitrator to hide the material evidence necessary for
the consumer to prevail.30 5 Also, without written opinions in arbitra-
tion, it is difficult for a consumer to prove on appeal that the arbitra-
tor erred in judgment, since there is no proof of the reasons for the
judgment. 306
301. "Unfortunately AAA [American Arbitration Association] panelists vary considerably in
experience and ability." Id. at 447. The AAA allows arbitrators to appoint themselves to the
panel without required training or experience in arbitration. Id. at 447-48. Would-be arbitrators
supply their own biographical information for review by the arbitrating parties and the AAA
does not routinely verify the information. Id. at 448. AAA suggests that the parties perform
their own investigations of potential arbitrators. Id. Such investigations can be very costly and
time consuming. See Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 448.
302. See STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 3
(1984) (stating that "because the jury comprises a number of individuals, the prejudices of a
single juror are not likely to destroy the capacity of the group to render a fair decision").
303. See infra notes 285-285 and accompanying text.
304. Consumer Financial Services Law Report, Controversy Surrounds Arbitration Clauses In
Consumer Contracts, in ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES: SAMPLES
STRATEGIES AND CASES 1, 2 (1999) (referring to a presentation by Barry A. Ragsdale of King,
Ivey & Warren, in Birmingham, Ala.). "Still another problem with arbitration clauses ... is that
courts often prohibit plaintiffs from engaging in substantial discovery .. . . [Clonsumers are
disadvantaged, especially on appeal, when the pertinent documents are in the hands of the credi-
tor and remain undiscoverable." Id.
305. See supra notes 246-248.
306. In a handbook which guides corporate lawyers in constructing arbitration clauses, the
author encourages lawyers to draft their own "code of civil arbitration:"
The fact that private parties can, to a very large extent, construct their own "code of
civil arbitration" by contract, and that such "code" may contain provisions that might
by deemed to be unfair, inefficient, wasteful, or otherwise socially undesirable, can cre-
ate an obvious tension with the broad and fundamental public policy of securing "the
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IV. IMPACT
A. Effects of Mandatory Arbitration on Remedies and Deterrence
In addition to losing consumer rights in arbitration, consumers lose
the traditional remedies that are allowed by the judicial system. 30 7
Many arbitration forums prohibit or limit punitive damages, statutory
damages, emotional damages, and awards of attorneys fees.308 The
limited damages act not only as a disincentive for large companies to
reform abusive practices, but also as a disincentive for consumers to
dispute the abusive practices.3°9
Arbitration is harmful to consumers, as a whole, for many reasons.
For instance, punitive damages exist to create an incentive for large
corporations to change their practices that hurt consumers. However,
if a corporation can afford to pay the actual damages of its victims
then it does not have any financial reason to stop the abusive or dan-
gerous practices. However, when large punitive damages are
awarded, a company is financially coerced into changing abusive and
dangerous practices in order to avoid the risk of future punitive dam-
ages which may hurt the financial operations of the company.310
just, speedy and inexpensive" resolution of civil disputes (Fed. R. Civ. P. 1). As arbitra-
tion displaces civil litigation to an ever greater extent, that tension will surface ever
more frequently and ultimately require adjustment. It may well be that arbitration
clauses in nonnegotiated form contracts ... will ultimately have to conform to certain
minimum standards and be barred from containing certain kinds of provisions ....
That day has not arrived, however. Today, lawyers preparing or revising contracts for
... companies that deal with the public under written contracts should certainly con-
sider arbitration clauses that specifically preclude consolidation, class treatment, puni-
tive damages, and other procedures and outcomes deemed undesirable by the client.
See HOENIGER, supra note 19, § 1.07, at 1-13-1-14.
307. See Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). In Powertel, an
arbitration clause was found to be unconscionable where a telephone company limited its own
liability in actual damages to consumer and punitive damages, because the customer lost reme-
dies that would have otherwise been available in court, while the telephone company effectively
lost no rights to remedies. Id.
30)8. See Stephan Landsman, et al., Be Careful What You Wish For: The Paradoxical Effects of
Biflurcating Claims for Punitive Damages, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 297, SPECIAL ISSUE THE FUTrURE OF
PUNIrIVE DAMAGES (1998) (recognizing that for corporations which would face stock devalua-
tion as a result of public reaction to punitive damages and pendency of other litigation, a com-
pensatory award will pose few problems).
309. See Budnitz, supra note 247, at 282. Avoidance of the possibility of punitive damages is
an objective of financial institutions which requires consumers to arbitrate disputes. Id.
"[Riemoving the threat of class action also removes the motivation for businesses to change and
reform their practices since arbitration awards rarely include punitive damages, statutory dam-
ages or attorneys' fees." See Consumer Financial Services Law Report, Controversy Surrounds
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts, in ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN CONSUMER FINANCIAL
SERVICES: SAMPLES, STATEGIS AND CASES 1, 2 (1999).
310. Arbitration may actually be more expensive than litigation for either party since parties
may be required to pay attorney's fees, the arbitrators' fees, institutional administration fees,
1234
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Without these large punitive awards, arbitration does not provide the
same financial coercion to force companies to stop harmful practices
in order to protect consumers.
Additionally, the prohibition of attorneys fees, common to most ar-
bitration forums, acts as a roadblock for damaged consumers. 31 1 Con-
sumers who cannot afford to hire an attorney are effectively
prevented from disputing any claim that would recover damages that
would be less than the attorneys fees necessary to bring the dispute.
Similarly, class action suits assist consumers who cannot afford to
bring a suit alone, however, the prohibition of class actions in arbitra-
tion simply adds to the discrimination against the consumer who can-
not afford arbitration but would have otherwise been able to
financially afford litigation as a member of a class.3 12
Arbitration is attractive to large corporations because it allows
them to avoid the complicated and time-consuming procedure re-
quired by the judicial system. However, the same procedure that
proves to annoy many corporations, exists to protect consumers.
Therefore, by eliminating the procedural safeguards that are impor-
tant to consumers, arbitration provides for resolutions favoring
corporations.
B. Mandatory Arbitration Clauses are a Burden on the
Judiciary System
Proponents of arbitration argue that the process relieves a burden
on the over-congested judiciary system by resolving disputes that
would have otherwise been litigated in court. This argument is not
persuasive when it comes to mandatory arbitration clauses in con-
sumer contracts because most consumers do not know that they have
and other miscellaneous arbitration expenses. See Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 452. Attorneys'
fees for arbitration actually may be greater than for litigation since the time for both a hearing
and preparation can be greater. Id.
311. See Bland, supra note 279, at 96 (stating that "[n]o court ... has refused to enforce a
mandatory arbitration clause on the grounds that it would eliminate the plaintiffs' ability to
pursue their claims on a class action basis"). Several courts have actually compelled arbitration,
pursuant to an arbitration clause, even when plaintiffs were prevented from seeking relief on a
class-wide basis. Id.; Kelly v. UHC Management Co., 967 F. Supp. 1240, 1252 (N.D. Ala. 1997):
Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Goodwin v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 970 F. Supp. 1007 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
312. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (stating that a party who is sued in court, even
though a mandatory arbitration clause exists, may ask the court to stay the litigation and compel
arbitration). The party who brought the suit can oppose the motion to stay by arguing that the
arbitration clause is unenforceable. See Budnitz, supra note 247, at 282 (stating a hearing will be
held by the court, not the arbitrator, to determine whether the arbitration clause is valid)). See
also A/S Ganger Rolf v. Zeeland Transp., Ltd., 191 F. Supp. 359, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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waived their rights to litigate. Thus, when a dispute arises, consumers
will likely attempt to invalidate the arbitration clause in court before
submitting to the arbitration.313 As a result, mandatory arbitration
clauses do not eliminate cases from the judiciary system, but rather
add a cause of action in many cases as plaintiffs seek injunctions to
hold the mandatory arbitration clause unenforceable. 3t 4 Moreover,
the lack of class actions in arbitrations may potentially necessitate
hundreds and thousands of separate suits to invalidate one adhesive
arbitration clause. If the plaintiffs had simply formed a class in the
first place, only one judicial action would have been necessary. 31 5
C. Methods for Consumers to Fight the Enforcement of Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses
Consumers can fight the enforceability of mandatory arbitration
clauses by using a variety of arguments based on contract law, con-
gressional intent, and Constitutional law.
1. Mandatory Arbitration Clauses May Violate Contract Law
The Supreme Court has interpreted the purpose of the FAA as not
to compel arbitration in every circumstance, but to compel arbitration
in a manner provided for by contract when the parties mutually agree
to arbitrate.31 6 The Supreme Court has held that "[a]rbitration is sim-
ply a matter of contract between parties; it is a way to resolve those
disputes-but only those disputes-that the parties have agreed to
submit to arbitration. '' 3t 7 This interpretation of the FAA supports the
need for the parties' intentions to be determined by the court before a
313. Proponents of arbitration may argue that attorneys use motions to stay arbitration as a
procedural tool to delay the arbitration process. See Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 451 (stating
that "a party wishing to avoid arbitration of a dispute may successfully delay commencement of
the process by resorting to the courts" and "[elven if the arbitration agreement is ultimately
enforced, dispute resolution will have been postponed for months or years"). This argument is
better suited for discussing defense's counsel then plaintiff's counsel, because the defendant gen-
erally would have a greater incentive to delay the process and temporarily avoid the possibility
of a negative judgment. A consumer attorney, especially when working for a contingency fee,
has an incentive to resolve the dispute quickly.
314. See supra notes 279-279 and accompanying text.
315. Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 474-75 (1989) (holding that
arbitration should proceed in the manner provided for in the parties agreement). See supra
notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
316. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
317. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Exalon Indus., Inc., 138 F.3d 426, 428 (1st Cir. 1998) (inter-
preting the Supreme Court precedent on enforceability of arbitration contracts as "dependent
on the private will of the parties as embodied in whatever contract they may have entered into").
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mandatory arbitration clause can be enforced.318 This determination
is particularly important in consumer contracts where the thrust of the
dispute is focused on the issue of whether the consumers intended to
waive their rights to the judicial system or agreed to the arbitration
clauses. 319 Since the company's strongest argument in this type of
case is that a written agreement to arbitrate exists, the strongest con-
tract law defenses available to the consumer are those that would ei-
ther invalidate the entire contract or the arbitration clause because of
substantive and procedural unconscionability. 3211
a. Substantive Unconscionability
Substantive unconscionability can be proven under the doctrine of
reasonable expectations or by the standard that the contract is one-
sided and unfairly oppresses or surprises an innocent party.321 The
doctrines of reasonable expectation or unfair surprise are applied in
cases where the contract is one of adhesion; thus, they are appropriate
standards to apply in consumer contracts. 322 The doctrine of reasona-
ble expectation allows the courts to look at whether the drafter of an
adhesion contract included terms that the less powerful party would
not have reasonably expected to be in the contract, and failed to ex-
plain or point out these terms to the less powerful party.323 Consum-
ers can argue that they did not expect to waive their rights to use the
judicial system when entering into a common consumer contract and
318. The Supreme Court set a standard that the arbitrability of a claim should not be decided
until the court first determines whether a valid arbitration agreement exists. First Options of
Chicago, Inc., 514 U.S. at 944-45.
319. "[S]tate law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable [to deciding enforce-
ability of arbitration clauses] if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocabil-
ity, and enforceability of contracts generally." Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987)
(refusing to determine whether an arbitration agreement was an unconscionable and unenforce-
able adhesion contract, but urging the issue to be considered on remand). See also 9 U.S.C. § 2
(1925) (mandating that an arbitration clause is not enforceable if it is invalid "upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract").
320. See Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 361-62 (Utah 1996) (laying out the standards considered
by various courts for substantive unconscionabilty). See also Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d
570, 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining the test for substantive unconscionability as a
showing that contract terms are unreasonable and unfair).
321. See supra note 295 (defining an adhesion contract).
322. Sosa, 924 P.2d at 362. See also Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d
1013, 1016 (Ariz. 1992) (stating that one judicial limitation imposed on the enforceability of
arbitration clauses is "that such a contract or provision which does not fall within the reasonable
expectations of the weaker or 'adhering' party will not be enforced against him").
323. This is evidenced by the number of consumers who consult consumer attorneys with the
intent to file a lawsuit against companies when disputes arise, without knowing that they alleg-
edly waived their rights to do so.
2001] 1237
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
that they did not realize that they waived those rights even after a
dispute had arisen.324
Courts will consider whether the adhesion contract required con-
sumers to give up legal remedies. 325 It has been found that arbitration
clauses that limit a company's liability to actual damages, precluding
punitive damages, are substantively unconscionable. 32 6 Thus, consum-
ers can argue that they did not expect to waive their rights to remedies
offered by litigation.
Consumers can also argue oppression or unfair surprise by the cor-
porations because the substitution of a judicial forum by arbitration
for dispute resolution is inherently oppressive to consumers as a
whole. For example, an arbitration clause which prohibits class action
litigation is oppressive to consumers.327 Since it may be impractical
for consumers with small claims to litigate their claims on an individ-
ual basis, the prohibition of class actions also prevents consumers
from receiving any remedy for their claims. 328 Arbitration clauses
may harm large groups of consumers, when those consumers other-
wise would have brought a class action in court.32 9
In addition, arbitration oppresses consumers when it does not allow
for adequate discovery in circumstances where the company holds
much of the relevant and incriminating information. 330 Another op-
pressive feature to arbitration is the lack of duty to follow or establish
precedent. 33' When consumers have identical contractual relation-
ships with the same company, the judicial system enforces precedent
against the company by construeing the contract against the drafter,
thereby protecting consumers who enter into similar contracts.
Whereas in arbitration, consumers have to individually dispute the
contract as though the issue had never been disputed before. Arbitra-
tion may not only result in a disparity of outcomes of identical dis-
putes, but it also places an excessive burden on a consumer who has
324. Powertel, 743 So. 2d at 576 (stating that the contract prohibiting punitive damages re-
moved a significant remedy that would be available in consumer litigation). In Powertel, the
defendant company argued that the limit on punitive damages applies to both parties, but the
court quickly pointed out that "it is difficult to imagine any situation in which a telephone com-
pany would have an action for punitive damages against its customers." Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. (discussing that when consumer claims are too small to litigate individually, they may
be litigated as a class-action, and by requiring arbitration, the defendant precluded the possibility
for its customers to join together to seek relief that they could not practically seek alone).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. See supra notes 284-285 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 241-241, 289-296 and accompanying text.
331. Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 362 (Utah 1996).
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been harmed by a powerful corporation, and adds to the oppressive
relationship between the consumer and that entity.
The unfair surprise standard is a strong defense for consumers.
When the arbitration clause is hidden in fine print in an adhesion con-
tract, not discussed with the consumer, and not negotiated for by the
parties, consumers may use the unfair surprise defense. If the con-
sumer can show that he did not expect to waive his rights to access the
judicial system as part of the agreement, he may prevail.
b. Procedural Unconscionability
"Procedural unconscionability focuses on the manner in which the
contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties. ' '332
Since procedural unconscionability is a state contract law claim, the
factors considered by the courts vary between states. However, the
Supreme Court of Utah laid out six common factors which it considers
in deciding procedural unconscionability:
(1) whether each party had a reasonable opportunity to understand
the terms and conditions of the agreement; (2) whether there was a
lack of opportunity for meaningful negotiation; (3) whether the
agreement was printed on a duplicate or boilerplate form drafted
solely by the party in the strongest bargaining position; (4) whether
the terms of the agreement were explained to the weaker party; (5)
whether the aggrieved party had a meaningful choice or instead felt
compelled to accept the terms of the agreement; and (6) whether
the stronger party employed deceptive practices to obscure key con-
tractual provisions. 333
In applying the indicators that were laid out by the court to con-
sumer contracts, all six of the factors indicate that a common con-
sumer contract may be procedurally unconscionable. For example,
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are rarely explained to con-
sumers, and those consumers who do read an arbitration clause are
not aware that they can no longer sue the company if a dispute arises.
Oftentimes, consumer arbitration clauses are sent to consumers via
the mail and there is no proof that a consumer received notice of the
arbitration clauses, much less that they actually read them. Conse-
quently, consumers can argue that stuffers do not provide a reasona-
332. Id. (citations omitted).
333. In Powertel, the defendant used a stuffer to inform consumers of an arbitration clause.
pursuant to a change-in-terms clause in the original consumer contract. Powertel, 743 So. 2d at
572. Since it can be argued that many consumers never read stuffers, it is possible that such
stuffers do not provide a reasonable opportunity for consumers to understand the terms and
conditions of the agreement.
2001] 1239
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
ble opportunity to understand the terms and conditions of the
agreement. 334
Additionally, unfair bargaining power is implied when a consumer
is not offered the opportunity to negotiate a contract that is offered on
a "take it or leave it" basis.335 Consumer contracts are typically
drafted by the company, the significantly stronger party, on a boiler
plate standardized form, thus indicating that they may be unconscion-
able. Another indication that a consumer contract may be uncon-
scionable is the fact that the terms are rarely explained to the
consumer, especially negative terms such as the arbitration clause, be-
cause most of the dealings between the parties are done via the
mail.336
Furthermore, courts should examine whether consumers have a
meaningful choice or whether they felt compelled to accept the terms
of the contract, particularly credit agreements. 337 For example, con-
sumers may feel that they have no meaningful choice in avoiding an
arbitration clause, if it means canceling their contract and dealing with
a different company, or forfeiting those services altogether. 338 Also,
consumers who are desperate for money, but cannot obtain secured
loans at reasonable interest rates, may feel compelled to accept the
unfavorable interest rates and terms of unsecured credit cards or
credit agreements, feeling as though they have no meaningful choice.
In addition, by hiding the arbitration clause in the contract's fine
print, often on the back of the agreement, or by adding an arbitration
clause to an existing agreement using a stuffer with a monthly bill,
companies attempt to deceive the consumers by preventing meaning-
334. In Powertel, the court found the fact that the contract containing the arbitration clause
was an adhesion contract to be a significant factor in its conclusion that the contract was proce-
durally unconscionable. Id.
An adhesion contract offered to consumers on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis does not afford the
consumer "a realistic opportunity to bargain and under such conditions that the consumer can-
not obtain the desired product or services except by acquiescing in the form contract." Wheeler
v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 783 (1977) (citations omitted); see also Broemmer v.
Abortion Services of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Ariz. 1992).
335. Even in many situations where the parties deal with each other face-to-face, the arbitra-
tion clause is not explained to the consumer. See supra notes 210-227 and accompanying text
(explaining cases in which arbitration clauses were in contracts that arose out of attorney-client
and doctor-patient relationships).
336. In Powertel, the court found that the consumers had a lack of meaningful choice where
they could only avoid the arbitration clause if they canceled their telephone service with the
defendant and signed up with a new provider. Powertel, 743 So. 2d at 574.
337. Id. See supra notes 188-208 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 250-262 and accompanying text (discussing that stuffers do not provide
adequate notice to consumers).
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ful notice of the waiver of rights to the judicial system.339 Even
though state contract law varies among states, these six elements are
likely to be influential on any court in holding a contract unconsciona-
ble and void.
c. Other Contract Claims
Many other contract law claims can also be raised to invalidate the
arbitration clause. The arbitration clauses often lack mutuality. Al-
though an arbitration clause may appear to be a waiver of the corpo-
ration's rights to access the judicial system, there may be another
clause in the contract claiming that the corporation will not waive its
rights to use the judicial system to collect money owed by the con-
sumer. The fact that contracts between large corporations and con-
sumers are adhesion contracts supports a lack of mutual assent
challenge.
Large corporations design contracts that are difficult to read, under-
stand, and interpret, while they profit from the fact that consumers
will not use the expertise of an attorney when entering into the agree-
ments and, consequently, will not realize that their rights to use the
judicial system have been waived. Consumers should be encouraged
to explore the full range of their state's contract law to fight the en-
forceability of mandatory arbitration clauses because an arbitration
clause may be held invalid if it, or the contract, is found to be
unconscionable .340
2. Mandatory Arbitration Clauses May Violate Congressional Intent
Even though the Supreme Court has a history of enforcing arbitra-
tion agreements under the FAA, it has left a window of opportunity to
invalidate arbitration agreements. Regardless of arbitration clauses,
parties may litigate disputes if Congress intended to preclude waiver
of judicial remedies for violation of the statute under which the claim
arises.341 The burden of proof of congressional intent is on the party
339. "[G]enerally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,
may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2 [of the FAA]."
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
340. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (considering whether
congressional intent in passing the ADEA was to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for
violation of the statute); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27
(1987) (stating that the FAA's "mandate may be overridden by a contrary congressional com-
mand"). See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985).
341. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1420 (M.D. Ala. 1997): Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
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who wishes to invalidate the arbitration agreement. 342 The consum-
ers' best argument is that mandatory arbitration clauses in adhesion
contracts do not provide real notice to, consent of, or bargaining by
consumers who allegedly waive their rights to a judicial remedy of
disputes.
Further, consumers may argue that arbitration is financially detri-
mental to them, because it is likely to be more costly than litigation
for individual consumer claims. 343 However, in Green Tree, the
United States Supreme Court held that the potential costliness of ar-
bitration alone is not enough to invalidate an arbitration clause. 344
Consequently, before a consumer can successfully raise prohibitive
cost as a reason to invalidate an arbitration clause, he must provide
proof of which arbitration forum will be used, and the actual costs of
that forum to the consumer. 345
In addition, consumers can argue that arbitration is harmful be-
cause it does not set precedent and arbitrators do not need to follow
precedent of prior decisions in favor of consumers in identical circum-
stances.346 These inequalities of arbitration, compared to litigation,
favor the company over the consumer, consequently violating Con-
gress' intent in enacting consumer protection statutes. 347 Consumers
may argue that Congress has enacted multiple statutes for the purpose
of consumer protection, and that any interpretation of the FAA that is
unfavorable to consumers would be at odds with congressional intent
in enacting the consumer protection statutes.
Although the Supreme Court has expressed a willingness to con-
sider congressional intent in invalidating arbitration clauses, it has
been reluctant to invalidate arbitration clauses for that reason. For
example, in Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc.,348 the Court rejected the argument that Congress intended to
protect the buyers of securities under the Securities Act of 1933 be-
cause the Act included language that prohibited waiver of compliance
of any provision of the Act.349 The securities buyers argued that judi-
cial remedy was required for compliance with the buyers' protection
under the Act because the judicial system inherently benefited con-
sumer buyers by allowing them a wider selection of judicial forums
342. See supra notes 131-161 and accompanying text.
343. See Green Tree, 121 S.Ct. at 521.
344. See id. at 521-22.
345. See supra notes 246-241 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 341.
347. 490 U.S. 477, 480-83 (1989).
348. See Rodriguez 490 U.S. at 478.
349. See supra notes 70-70 and accompanying text.
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from which to choose to settle their claims. 350 The Court's reason for
rejecting this argument was that a wider choice of courts was not an
essential feature of the Securities Act.351 The Court supported its de-
cision by stating that substantive rights and remedies were not waived
by an agreement to arbitration, and the arbitrator must follow statu-
tory law.352 This decision implied that in order to succeed on a con-
gressional intent claim, consumers must cite to specific language in the
statute under which their claim arises that precludes the waiver of an
element of judicial resolution which is not offered by the particular
arbitration clause, such as punitive damages, class action disputes, ad-
herence to judicial precedent, and written opinions. This can be diffi-
cult and nearly impossible for consumers to prove unless the statute
proscribes a judicial forum for resolution of disputes arising under the
statute.
While Supreme Court precedent does not seem favorable to this
argument, consumers should continue to argue that the congressional
intent in enacting consumer protection statutes cannot be reconciled
with a waiver of rights to the judicial system. The argument should
not focus on the substantive rights provided by the statute, but rather
on the procedural rights guaranteed by the judicial system. The Court
stated that "the right to select the judicial forum and the wider choice
of courts are not ... so critical that they cannot be waived under the
rationale that the Securities Act was intended to place buyers of se-
curities on an equal footing with sellers. ' 353 This rationale can be
taken a step further with consumer statutes where Congress' intent
was to place consumers on equal footing with companies within
mandatory arbitration.
Consumers will need to prove the procedural disadvantages inher-
ent in arbitration and that the disadvantages will harm consumers as a
whole and obviate the congressional intent to statutorily protect con-
sumers.354 Some examples of federal consumer protection statutes
350. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 483.
351. Id. at 481.
352. Id. at 481.
353. See supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text.
354. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1994). The purpose of TILA to protect consumers is stated in
the Act as follows:
It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so
that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms availa-
ble to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against
inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices .... It is the purpose of
this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of the terms of leases of personal
property for personal, family, or household purposes so as to enable the lessee to com-
pare more readily the various lease terms available to him, limit balloon payments in
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that consumers can use to make this type of argument are the Truth in
Lending Act (TILA),35 5 the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 3 5 6 the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,3 5 7 and the Fair Debt Collection Prac-
tices Act.3 58 Therefore, if a consumer can prove that Congress in-
tended for consumers to be on equal footing with companies and that
the procedural rules of the judicial system are necessary to facilitate
this equal footing, then the consumer may succeed in invalidating the
mandatory arbitration clause.35 9
consumer leasing, enable comparison of lease terms with credit terms where appropri-
ate, and to assure meaningful and accurate disclosures of lease terms in advertisements.
15 U.S.C § 1601 (1994).
In TILA, Congress devoted an entire section to civil liability for violation of the Act. 15
U.S.C. § 1640 (1994). This section includes the amount of allowable damages for a class action.
15 U.S.C. § 1640 (a)(2)(B) (1994); 15 U.S.C. §1640 (a)(4) (1994). TILA also allows for any
action under the Act to be brought in Court as follows: "[alny action under this section may be
brought in any United States district court, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction,
within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation." 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (e) (1994).
355. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994). The ECOA explicitly allows for civil liability of a creditor who
violates the act on an individual or class-wide basis, as follows: "Any creditor who fails to comply
with any requirement imposed under this subchapter shall be liable to the aggrieved applicant
for any actual damages sustained by such applicant acting either in an individual capacity or as a
member of a class." 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (a) (1994).
The ECOA also explicitly allows for a consumer to bring an action in a judicial district court or
other court as follows: "[a]ny action under this section may be brought in the appropriate
United States district court without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of
competent jurisdiction." 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (f) (1994).
356. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1994).
357. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1994). Congress devoted an entire section of the FDCPA to civil liabil-
ity for violations of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (1994). The FDCPA explicitly allows for recov-
ery by class action of $500,000 or one percent of the debt collector's worth. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k
(a)(2)(B) (1994).
358. In Alabama, consumers have succeeded in invalidating arbitration clauses under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. In Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Lee, an Alabama court held
that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act prohibited the enforcement of an arbitration clause that
was included in a written warranty. 732 So. 2d 994, 1000 (Ala. 1999). See also Wilson v.
Waverlee Homes, Inc., 127 F.3d 40 (11 th Cir. 1997) (holding that under the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act written warranties may not provide for binding arbitration); Boyd v. Homes of
Legend, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1423 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (same).
359. U.S. CONsr. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
deems it the supreme law of the land which cannot be violated by any other law. Id. The
Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State




3. Mandatory Arbitration Clauses May Violate the United States
Constitution
While Congress has few limits on the scope of its power in enacting
a statute such as the FAA, it cannot violate the United States Consti-
tution.360 Federal courts have struck down state statutes that require
specific notice of arbitration clauses in contracts in order for the
clauses to be enforceable. 36' The courts use the FAA and federal pol-
icy favoring arbitration to support these decisions because the FAA
mandates that any state law applicable to arbitration clauses must be
applicable to contracts as a whole, and not specifically directed at ar-
bitration clauses.362 Congress and the courts have neglected to ad-
dress the issue of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of citizens to
use the judicial system in civil disputes.
While rights guaranteed by the Constitution may be waived, indi-
viduals must have adequate notice that they are waiving their
rights. 363 Adhesion contracts containing hidden arbitration clauses do
not meet the notice required for a waiver that have been established
in cases concerning constitutionally guaranteed rights.364 By enacting
statutes that guarantee notice of waiver, states are protecting rights
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.3 65 Congress' authority to
govern contract law is limited by the Constitution; thus, it cannot en-
act statutes that favor the waiver of constitutionally guaranteed rights
without adequate notice.
D. Congress Should Amend the FAA to Protect Consumers
Congress enacted the FAA to encourage dispute resolution outside
of the judicial system in a more efficient, affordable, and quicker fo-
rum. Since the creation of the FAA, multiple issues have arisen that
360. See supra notes 75-92, 117-124 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 119-124 and accompanying text.
362. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (finding that waiver of constitutional
rights laid out in Miranda warnings canpot be waived without full awareness of the nature of the
waived rights and the consequences of waiving those rights).
363. While an argument can be made that waiver of rights in criminal cases is more deserving
of protection than in civil cases because criminal cases usually involve the defendant's personal
liberty, it is interesting to note that the same arguments regarding the waiver of constitutional
rights raised in criminal cases could be raised in civil cases. See Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 (holding
that a waiver of defendant's rights is not valid if it is a product of deception); North Carolina v.
Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (holding that in order for a suspect's constitutional rights to be
waived, the suspect must understand his rights and waive them voluntarily); United States v.
Connell, 869 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that notice of waiver of the right to an attorney
in a criminal case must not be misleading).
364. See supra notes 75-92, 117-124 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 278-306 and accompanying text.
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were not contemplated by Congress in 1925. The most significant
modern issue in the consumer law arena is the growing disparity of
power between consumers and large corporations which carries over
to dispute resolution and is significant in the private arbitration of dis-
putes. The procedural rules of the judicial system are designed to pro-
tect the less powerful party in litigating disputes, 366 however, many of
these protections are eliminated in arbitration forums.367
Consumers who are forced to arbitrate disputes with large compa-
nies are placed at an immediate disadvantage in their ability to access
information relative to their dispute which is in the hands of their op-
ponent.368 In the quest for efficiency, arbitration discourages the type
of extensive discovery necessary to meet the burden of proof in some
of the most persuasive consumer claims. 369 In the quest for af-
fordability, arbitration often requires each party to pay its own costs
to arbitrate claims,370 which may actually harm consumers who would
have otherwise: (1) brought a class action suit in court at no cost to
themselves; (2) asked for court costs and attorneys fees as part of their
damages in court; or (3) hired a lawyer on a contingency basis who
would be reluctant to represent a consumer in arbitration where dam-
ages are often limited. 371
In its quest for a quicker process, arbitration has very limited appel-
late review which may harm consumers who feel that the arbitrators
were biased or did not fairly resolve the dispute.372 Arbitration
clauses may also take more of a consumer's time and money than the
unrestricted use of the judicial system. For example, the consumer
needs to participate in a separate hearing in court to fight the enforce-
ability of the arbitration clause and, pursuant to the court's decision,
proceed to arbitrate the claim or resolve the dispute in court.373 In
light of these issues which are very prominent in modern consumer
law, Congress should re-evaluate its purpose in enforcing the FAA.
Congress should amend the FAA to take consumer protection into
account. Congress has enacted several statutes with the sole purpose
of consumer protection. Thus, the time has come to allow the FAA to
either become one of those statutes or become inapplicable to con-
366. See supra notes 278-306 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 285, 305 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 285, 305 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 310, 310 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 310, 312 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 292, 295-296 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 48-227 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
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sumer contracts. 374 As it currently stands, the FAA can be used as a
tool for companies to weaken or water down the effect of consumer
protection statutes by allowing a forum for the resolution of disputes.
Congress could simply amend the FAA to not apply to consumer con-
tracts. In addition, Congress could eliminate its ban under the FAA
on state statutes that place stringent requirements on arbitration
clauses in order for the clauses to be enforceable. 375 Therefore, this
would allow a state to protect consumers within its own jurisdiction
and allow a local forum to debate the issue. If allowing a state to
make the laws pertaining to arbitration clauses is too much delegation
of power for Congress, it can simply make its own provisions requiring
special notice of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. Congress
could also amend the statutes that it created for consumer protection
to further include a provision specifically prohibiting waiver of the
right to use the judicial system for claims arising under those statutes.
Finally, Congress could amend the FAA to not apply to claims arising
under specific consumer protection statutes.
The Wilko v. Swan376 decision dictated that the Securities Act was
intended to protect buyers of securities377 and held that arbitration
clauses were not enforceable under that Act because the arbitration
forum was less favorable to buyers than the judicial forum, and in ef-
fect arbitration clauses violate Congressional intent in enacting the
statute.378 The Swan decision was overturned, three and a half de-
cades later. 379 During that time, Congress did not elect to amend the
FAA to enforce arbitration clauses in disputes arising under the Se-
curities Act.380 This silent acquiescence to the Swan decision evi-
dences that Congress did not intend for the FAA to have the hard-
lined enforcement of all arbitration clauses that courts believed it to
have. In Rodriguez, Justice Stevens implied in his dissent that the
Court overstepped its judicial authority by overturning "an interpreta-
tion of an Act of Congress that has been settled for many years."'381
Congress should restore the balance between judicial and legislative
authority and amend the FAA to restrict application to consumer con-
374. See supra notes 75-92, 117-124 and accompanying text.
375. 346 U.S. 427, 427 (1953).
376. Id.
377. Id. at 438.
378. Decided in 1953, Swan was overturned in 1987 by McMahan. See Swan, 346 U.S. 427
(1953): McMahan, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
379. Id.
380. Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 487 (1989).
381. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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tracts in order to prevent any future measures of judicial activism on
the subject of arbitration.
Congress should take into consideration the difficulty the courts
face in determining Congressional intent in the area of arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts. Congress should also consider the
harm imposed on consumers by large companies which are supported
by the judicial system under the FAA, and amend the FAA to better
protect consumers.
E. The Supreme Court Should Address the Issue of Notice and
Consent in the Enforcement of Arbitration Clauses in
Adhesion Contracts
Time and again the Supreme Court has interpreted Congressional
intent in creating the FAA to support the enforcement of contracts as
they are intended to be enforced by the parties. 382 The parties' intent
is then found in the language of the written agreement, and if the
agreement included an arbitration clause, the Court would enforce
it.383 The Court has never addressed problems that might arise when
the written agreement does not reflect the intent of one of the con-
tracting parties. 384 In fact, in Green Tree, the Court had the opportu-
nity to address the issue of notice of an arbitration clause in a
consumer contract, but bypassed the issue by declaring that it was un-
disputed that the parties agreed to arbitrate their disputes. 38 5 How-
ever, in Green Tree, there was evidence that the consumer did dispute
the fact that she agreed to arbitrate the dispute because the reason she
brought her claims to court was to invalidate the arbitration clause
and she, subsequently, appealed the court's decision to enforce the
clause. 386
The problems relating to the lack of consumer intent to arbitrate
disputes and the lack of notice to consumers about arbitration clauses
in contracts occur where the drafting party is more sophisticated and
more powerful than the consumer.3 87 Large companies have devised
several methods to effectively "hide" certain clauses from the con-
sumer, including arbitration clauses. The most common way to hide
an arbitration clause is to simply place it on the back of a double sided
382. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
383. Some lower courts have addressed issues relating to lack of consumer intent to arbitrate.
See supra notes 159-227 and accompanying text.
384. See Green Tree, 121 S.Ct. at 518.
385. See id.
386. See supra notes 131-227 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 131-227 and accompanying text.
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contract, in fine print, and in complicated language. Often with these
types of contracts, the consumer never realizes that the arbitration
clause was in the agreement.
If the consumer does read the arbitration clause, the consumer may
not be fully aware of the rights he is forfeiting by agreeing to the
clause because the company failed to explain the clause to him.388 A
more creative way to hide an arbitration clause became the subject of
litigation in Badie389 and Stiles.390 The defendants in these cases in-
cluded a "change-in-terms" agreement in the original contracts with
the consumers. 391 At a later date, the companies mailed a stuffer to
the consumers inside the envelope with the consumers' monthly
bill.392 The stuffers were the companies' method of changing the
terms of the agreements and, in both cases, the stuffers contained an
arbitration clause.3 93
In Badie, the California Court of Appeal found that "when the ac-
count agreements were entered into, the parties did not intend that
the change of terms provision [would] allow the Bank to add com-
pletely new terms such as an [alternative dispute resolution] clause
simply by sending out a notice. ' 394 In Stiles, a United States District
Court in Alabama held that the plaintiff "assented to the contract as a
whole" and the contract could be changed by a change-in-terms agree-
ment.3 95 The court continued, "therefore, [the plaintiff] assented to
an arbitration clause [which was added to the contract as a change of
terms], even absent his signature. ' 396 These two courts were faced
with almost identical facts, yet their decisions were directly opposed to
one another.
The Supreme Court needs to address the question of whether the
intent of the consumer should be taken into account when invalidating
arbitration clauses, especially when companies use stuffers to add the
arbitration clause to the contract. Until this issue is resolved, the deci-
sions of the lower courts will be unpredictable and companies will
continue abusive practices. The Supreme Court should not assume
that consumers have notice of arbitration clauses in contracts, as it did
388. Stiles v. Home Cable Concepts, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1410, 1416 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
389. Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1998).
390. Id. at 276; Stiles, 994 F. Supp. at 1411.
391. Badie, 79 Cal Rptr. 2d at 277; Stiles, 994 F. Supp. at 1414.
392. Badie, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 278; Stiles, 994 F. Supp. at 1414.
393. See supra notes 162-162 and accompanying text.
394. Badie, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289.




in Green Tree.397 Rather, in light of its prior holdings that enforce
contracts as they were intended to be enforced by the parties, the Su-
preme Court must examine whether consumers actually knew that
they were forfeiting their rights to the judicial system, not simply
whether they signed a contract that included an arbitration clause.
Accordingly, consumer notice, or lack thereof, should always be a de-
cisive factor in deciding whether to enforce an arbitration clause.
Without notice of the waiver of their rights, it is hard to reason that
the consumers intended to waive them.
In Rodriguez, the Court emphasized its own assessment that the
"arbitration process does not inherently undermine any of the sub-
stantive rights afforded to petitioners under the Securities Act. '398 If
this assessment is assumed to be true, consumer contracts with arbitra-
tion clauses will continue to threaten procedural rights of the consum-
ers. The United States Supreme Court should take the next step and
examine whether arbitration undermines any of the procedural rights
afforded to the consumers by the judicial system. These procedural
rights were created to place less powerful parties on a level playing
field when resolving a dispute with a more powerful party. 99 Until
the Court resolves this issue, procedural securities of fairness afforded
by the judicial system may be meaningless to many consumers who
unknowingly entered an agreement to arbitrate their disputes.
V. CONCLUSION
The FAA allows corporations to force consumers to arbitrate dis-
putes that would otherwise be resolved in the judicial system. 4°° Com-
panies regularly take measures to conceal arbitration clauses from
consumers by neglecting to explain them to the consumers, hiding
them in fine print, and adding them to contracts using mailing stuffers
and change-in-terms clauses.4°11 Courts regularly enforce arbitration
clauses where consumers have little or no notice that they have
waived their fundamental right to use the judicial system.402 The
FAA, which once served to protect parties who entered into contracts,
is today being used to harm consumers who have significantly less
power than large companies with which they enter into agreements.
The American judicial system includes many procedural safeguards
397. See supra notes 131-161 and accompanying text.
398. Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 486 (1989).
399. See supra notes 278-306 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 250-277 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 61, 177-159 and accompanying text.
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that allow a person to have a fair forum for resolution of disputes,
even when the person is fighting a party that is significantly more
powerful outside of the courtroom. 40 3 Most arbitration forums do not
have such safeguards, thus explaining why they are more attractive to
powerful parties.404 Until companies are prevented from enforcing
mandatory arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts, consumers' fun-
damental rights to the judicial system will be trampled on, companies
will be able to avoid setting unfavorable precedent in court, and con-
sumer protection law will become superfluous.
Shelly Smith
403. See supra notes 185-306 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 185-306 and accompanying text.
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